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In September 1984, the United States Navy began closing
the largest leveraged lease transaction ever conducted in
the world. This transaction, when completed, will provide
the Navy with the services o-f thirteen cargo ships and -five
oil tankers which have a combined cost o-f approximately
*2.65 billion.
The magnitude o-f the cost o-f this transaction, coupled
with its highly complex legal and -financial terms, have made
it one o-f the most controversial Navy programs in recent
years. That controversy has encompassed several diverse
areas including: lease versus purchase comparative cost
analytical methodologies, the propriety o-f the procurement
o-f Department o-f Defense assets through leases, and the use
o-f tax bene-fit transfers by Federal government agencies to
-finance the procurement o-f capital assets.
A. BACKGROUND
The acquistion o-f Department o-f Defense assets through
leasing is not a recent innovation. The Navy's Military
Seali-ft Command (MSC) has regularly chartered ships under
long—term and short—term agreements since the early 1950 's.
In 1972, MSC acquired nine tankers under a build and charter
program similar to the present lease acquisition program.
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Controversy over Defense Department leasing is also not
new. The Government Accounting O-f -f ice issued a report in
1973, entitled, Report to the Congress on the Build and
Charter Program -for Nine Tanker Ships , which questioned the
Navy's assertion that leasing was less expensive than buying
the nine tankers MSC acquired in 1972. In 1974, an analysis
conducted -for the Chie-f o-f Naval Operations about the
-feasibility o-f using build and charter programs concluded
that leasing "tends to increase the costs o-f obtaining Navy
ships" and that buying was the optimal method o-f acquiring
Navy assets. CRe-f. 13
In 1982, however, the Navy presented two separate
analyses which concluded leasing was less expensive than
buying thirteen cargo ships needed to provide logistic
support -for the Marines. That program, the Navy's TAKX
Maritime Preposi t i oni ng Ships procurement program, was
subsequently subjected to two separate government analyses.
Those studies determined, contrary to earlier Navy studies,
that leasing would be much more costly than buying the TAKX
ships.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVES
The acquisition o-f capital assets through leasing has
long been a source o-f disagreement among -financial managers
charged with capital budgeting responsibilities. The costs
and bene-fits o-f leasing are relatively simple to determine
-from a theoretical standpoint. In actual practice, however,
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the quanti -f i cation o-f those costs and bene-f its is a much
more di-f-ficult process subject to di-f-fering assumptions and
analytical treatment.
The use o-f leases by tax—exempt entities has raised a
whole new set o-f considerations in the already complex
1 ease—versus—buy decision process. The Navy's TAKX
transaction provides a real world example o-f the issues and
controversy which surround government leasing.
This study will address several o-f those issues while
-focusing on two aspects o-f government leasing. The -first
aspect o-f government lease analysis is to determine whether
a lease is less costly than a purchase o-f a needed asset. To
date, the majority o-f the attention and controversy which
have surrounded the TAKX transaction have concerned this
aspect: i.e.
,
the government cost o-f leasing versus the
government cost o-f buying. A second, but equally important,
aspect o-f government leasing has been virtually ignored. The
government should compare its cost o-f leasing a particular
asset with a similar transaction in the private sector.
Such a comparison is important because it provides a
benchmark to help the government determine whether it has
obtained reasonable lease -financing terms.
The purpose o-f this study is -five -fold. First, it is
designed to provide the reader with a review o-f the
structure and the financial and tax accounting requirements
-for leases in general. As part o-f that review, public
sector leasing and the reasons -for its popularity among tax
exempt entities will be discussed. The Navy's TAKX
leveraged lease transaction is presented as a specific
example o-f public sector leasing because it provides
enormous insight into the reasons, processes and parties
included in such transactions. More specifically, the TAKX
transaction presents these components within the context of
a Department of Defense procurement program.
Second, the controversial issues and aspects of the TAKX
leveraged lease will be reviewed. The specific assumptions
and methodologies used by the various cost analyses which
compared the TAKX lease with a purchase alternative will be
examined. In particular, this study will address the
confusion surrounding the existence of a purchase
alternative. In point of fact, there was no purchase
alternative available to the Navy. All studies to date have
ignored this real limitation imposed on the Navy when
Congress chose not to appropriate funds to purchase the
TAKX ships. The issue was not one of whether the ships
should be purchased or leased, but rather was a question of
whether the Navy obtained a reasonable and equitable lease
agreement.
Third, the financing practices of private shipping
companies in the United States are presented as a basis for
comparison with the TAKX transaction. Various studies have
criticized the TAKX transaction as overly generous to its
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investors, but the analysis conducted to date is
i nsu-F-F i ci ent to support such claims. The government's
1 ease—versus-buy analysis should consider contemplated
transactions in light o-F similar private sector
opportunities. This study looks at that comparison and
other related issues.
Fourth, this study will present the reader with a review
o-f recent legislation and Government initiatives which have
changed the -face o-f public sector leasing. These changes
have greatly restricted the use o-f leases by defense
agencies as vehicles -for procurement. The question o-f
whether those changes have gone too -far and prohibit leasing
when it could be bene-ficial to Government interests is
addressed
.
Fi-fth, assuming that at some -future point in time Navy
is permitted to proceed with a leasing arrangement similar
to the TAKX transaction, a -framework is provided to guide
that process. The purpose o-f the -framework is to call
attention to some o-f the important lessons learned -from the
TAKX leveraged lease.
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research -for this study proceeded along two distinct
paths. An exhaustive search of current periodical
literature was conducted to identi-fy those issues presently
considered important or controversial in private and public
sector leasing. That search was heuristic, o-ften the result
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o-f recommendations or i n-f ormati on received -from personal
interviews or telephone conversations. This study relies
heavily upon available transaction documents to provide the
basic terms o-f the Navy's leveraged lease. The major
studies conducted by the Joint Committee on Taxation, the
General Accounting Office, the Institute -for Defense
Analysis and Argent Group, Ltd., also provided an invaluable
source o-f i n-f ormati on about the methods, procedures, and
guidelines used in Federal 1 ease-versus-purchase analysis.
Interviews, both personal and by telephone, provided the
essential details needed to understand the complex legal and
-financial aspects of the Navy's lease. In that regard,
several people were especially help-ful in enabling the
author to make sense o-f those details. Mr. William
Neustadt, and Mr. Lars Anderson at Military Seali-ft Command;
and Ms. Nancy Mattson and Mr. Marty Gottlieb o-f Argent
Group. Ltd.; and Cdr. Robert Gustavus, the initial
contracting officer for the TAKX transaction, supplied much
of the documentation and provided invaluable insight into
the issues and the problems encountered in arranging such a
technically complex transaction. Mr. Derrick Medcalf of
American Presidents Lines; and Mr. Richard Rogers of
BankAmeri Lease Group, provided a private sector view of
lease financing and ship leveraged leases. Mr. Melvin Long
and Mr. Lawrence Fergeson of the U.S. Maritime
Administration; and Mr. Jeff White, an economic analysist in
the Of -f ice o-f the Secretary of Defense were equally
invaluable in providing information concerning ship
financing and Federal lease analyses.
D. ORGANIZATION
This study is presented in the fallowing chapters.
Chapter Two provides a general overview of leasing and its
many forms. The leasing decision, financial and tax
accounting treatment of leases, the leveraged lease,
tax—exempt leasing, and merchant ship leases Ar& all
discussed to provide a foundation from which to analyze the
Navy's TAKX leveraged lease.
Chapter Three presents the TAKX leveraged lease, its
principal terms, and financial structure in detail. In
addition, the impact of TAKX on the Navy budget and on
Federal leasing practices is assessed. Chapter Four reviews
the various lease versus buy cost comparison studies
conducted by the Navy and other government agencies. The
differing methodologies and conflicting conclusions of these
studies Are presented to provide the reader with a sense of
the complexity inherent in the 1 ease—versus—buy cost
compar i son
.
Chapter Five addresses private sector ship financing
practices. This section is intended to draw attention to
the other aspect of government lease analysis: government
cost as opposed to comparable private sector costs.
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Chapter Six analyzes the major issues raised in the
preceding chapters. The various issues surrounding
government 1 ease—versus-purchase analyses are examined.
The TAKX transaction is compared to similar private sector-
charters in an e-f-fort to highlight the similarities and
di -f -f erences between Navy and private leasing practices.
Recent legislation and other government initiatives have
restricted Federal agency leasing to the point where
transactions such as TAKX will no longer be possible.
Chapter Seven reviews the lessons learned -from the
Navy's TAKX transaction and provides a -framework -from which
-future DOD leases can be structured. It also recommends
areas which appear pro-fitable -for -further study as a result
o-f having examined the Navy's latest experience with
leveraged leasing.
The opinions expressed in this study are those o-f the
author, and do not reflect o-f-ficial opinion or represent the
position o-f the Navy or the Department o-f Defense.
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II. BACKGROUND
Leasing has o-f-fered the private sector an attractive
source o-f capital -for -financing acquistion o-f assets -for a
number o-f years. Not until the passage o-f the Economic
Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) o-f 1981, however, did leasing o-f-fer
the public sector an equally attractive -financing
alternative. Prior to ERTA, tax—exempt entities used their
superior credit or tax—exempt status to raise -funds through
conventional means at a lower cost than was available
through leasing. The greatly liberalized leasing rules
under ERTA, however, enabled tax-exempt entities to use
previously unavailable ownership tax benefits to partially
subsidize their acquisitions. The Navy's use o-f ERTA ' s
relaxed leasing rules in the TAKX transaction,
un-f ortunatel y , -focused the public's attention on the
propriety o-f using those subsidies.
This chapter will review the general nature o-f leasing
and review the rules and regulations which govern the
-financial and tax accounting -for leases. It will examine
speci-fic leasing practices such as leveraged leasing and the
use o-f tax benefit trans-fers by tax—exempt entities to
subsidize part o-f the costs o-f their leases. Finally, this
chapter will look indepth at the various contractual
parties, documents, and the structure o-f a ship leveraged
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lease to provide a -foundation -for better understanding the
issues raised in subsequent chapters.
A. THE LEASING DECISION
The decision to lease or buy an asset is a secondary
consideration in the capital budgeting process. Contemporary
-financial opinion adheres to the principal that the
attractiveness o-f any capital investment opportunity should
be appraised without reference to the type o-f -financing
which will be used to gain the use o-f that asset. In that
regard, the question o-f whether an entity should lease or
buy an asset is secondary to the question o-f whether the
entity should acquire the asset in the first place. Once
the decision has been made to invest in a capital asset,
then the entity is ready to address the question o-f how to
-finance the acquisition o-f that asset. CRe-f. 23
When -faced with the question o-f how to acquire an asset,
the decision-maker can make one o-f two basic choices: buy
the asset or lease it. To make that decision, several
•factors must be considered, the most important o-f which
include: CRe-fs. 3 and 43
One, the ability o-f the entity to raise -funds to buy the
asset. Entities in the private sector must consider the
availability o-f equity and debt capacity. Public sector
entities must assess their ability to obtain procurement
appropriations -from the authorizing body.
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Two, the total relative costs o-f buying versus leasing
must be compared. Since there Are di-f-ferent cash -flows
associated with each alternative, some meaning-ful method o-f
comparison must be used.
Three, the impact o-f the method o-f acquiring the asset
on the entity's financial statements must be assessed.
Purchase o-f the asset requires disclosure o-f any liability
incurred in its purchase. Leasing, on the other hand, can
be "o-f -f —bal ance sheet" -financing and no such liability is
di scl osed.
Four, the risks and costs inherent in the buy and lease
alternatives. Obsolescence, -for instance, may be a major
concern which makes the lease alternative more attractive
than a purchase.
Five, the availability o-f tax benefits is usually a
major advantage to buying. The ability to use the tax
benefits inherent in ownership, however, is a major
consideration which may favor the lease alternative.
Six, the selection of an appropriate cost comparison
methodology that takes into account all of the pertinent
elements, in addition to those listed above, involved in the
lease versus buy decision is a critical task.
The process of selecting the financing alternative to
acquire an asset encompasses several criteria which require
managerial judgement as well as quantitative analysis. The
lease and buy alternatives aire 1 in themselves, a system of
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complex decisions. The decision to buy is o-ften a decision
to "borrow" since -Few companies are able, or -find it to
their advantage, to -fund capital investments purely -from
equity sources. The lease alternative is even more complex
to decipher because there are so many -facets to be
considered when structuring a lease. The multiple aspects
o-f leasing are reviewed in the next section. In summary, the
decision to lease or buy is not an investment decision,
rather it is a -financing decision.
B. LEASES IN GENERAL
A lease is an agreement between two parties: a lessor
who owns an asset and a lessee who uses the asset. The
lease agreement conveys to the lessee the right to use an
asset owned by the lessor -for a speci-fic period o-f time in
return -for a stipulated series o-f cash payments. This
series o-f cash payments is set to enable the lessor to
recover the cost incurred to procure the asset, arrange the
lease, and provide a satisfactory rate o-f return on the
investment in the asset awer the li-fe o-f the lease. Title
to the leased asset is retained by the lessor. At the end
o-f the lease term, the lessee usually has three options:
(1) renew the lease
,
(2) buy the asset, or (3) terminate
the lease and return the asset to the lessor. The terms
under which the lessee can exercise any o-f the three options
determine the classification o-f the lease -for tax purposes
as well as -for -financial accounting purposes.
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Leases Are classi-fed -from two di-f-ferent perspectives.
From an accounting standpoint, leases Are classi-fied as
either capital leases or operating leases. The accounting
distinction between a capital and operating lease is
speci-fied even -further dependent upon whether it is the
lessor or the lessee who is accounting -for the lease.
From an Internal Revenue Service standpoint , leases Are
classi-fied as either true leases or conditional sale
(pseudo) leases. The principal -financial bene-fit o-f lower
acquisition cost, commonly attributed to leasing, is
dependent upon the lease being classi-fied by the IRS as a
true lease. Classification as a true lease permits the
indirect realization o-f tax bene-fits which might otherwise
be lost. The true lease enables the lessor to claim the tax
bene-fits o-f ownership and pass through to the lessee some o-f
those bene-fits in the form a reduced rentals.
Classification as conditional sale lease, however,
recognizes the lessee as the owner -for tax purposes. The
lessor is unable to recognize any tax bene-fits and cannot
charge a lease rate which is competitive with a purchase
-financed using conventional borrowing. Classification as a
conditional sale lease is generally unacceptable for both
the lessor and lessee. The criteria for the classification
of leases from both an accounting standpoint and an income
tax standpoint Are presented below. CRef . 51
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C. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES
1 . The Lessee
From the lessee's standpoint, a lease is classi-fied
as either a capital (financing) lease or as an operating
lease. The capital lease provides the lessee with most o-f
the bene-fits and responsibilities o-f ownership except -for
legal title and any bene-fits -from the asset's residual value
at the end o-f the lease term. Significantly, the capital
lease requires the lessee to carry the asset on its balance
sheet both as an asset and as a liability at the present
value o-f the unpaid lease payments. Classification of the
lease as an operating lease, on the other hand, provides for
the temporary use of the asset without the lessee assuming
any ownership rights or risks. As a result, no balance
sheet entries are required to record acquisition of the
asset. For that reason, operating leases are referred to as
"off balance sheet financing." CRef. 61
For the lessee, the lease must be classified as a
capital lease if it meets one or more of the following
criteria: CRef. 73
a. Lease transfers ownership of the asset to the lessee.
b. Lease contains a bargain purchase option.
c. Lease term is equal to or greater than 757. of the
estimated economic life of the leased asset.
d. Present Value of the minimum lease payments equals or
exceeds 90"/ of the fair value of the leased asset.
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2. The Lessor
For the lessor, leases are classi-fied in one of
three ways:
a. Operating lease,
b. Direct -financing lease, or
c. Sales type lease.
The lease must be classi-fied as a direct -financing
lease or as a sales type lease i -f the lease meets any one o-f
the -four criteria needed to be classi-fied as a capital lease
-for the lessee, and meets both o-f the -following criteria:
a. Collectibility o-f the lease payments -from the lessee
is reasonably predictable.
b. No important uncertainties exist over the
unrei mbursabl e costs yet to be incurred by the
lessor under the lease.
The di-f-ference in classification between the direct
-financing and the sales-type lease exists in the presence or
absence o-f a manufacturer's or dealer's profit. A
sales—type lease involves a profit or loss while a direct
financing lease does not. Determination between the two is
made at the inception of the lease when the fair market
value of the asset is compared with the lessor's cost. If
fair market value and cost are different, the lease is
classified as a sales—type lease. If fair market value and
lessor's cost are the same, the lease is classified as a
direct financing lease. If the lease is unable to meet
direct financing or sales criteria, it must be classified as
an operating lease. CRef. 6]
Classi -f icati an as a direct -financing lease permits
the lessor to recognize income -from the lease by amortizing
unearned income over the lease term so as to produce a
constant periodic return on the net lease investment.
Classi-f ication as a sales type lease would lead to the lease
being classified as a "pseudo" or conditional sale lease
which would prohibit the lessor -from taking advantage o-f the
tax benefits inherent in ownership.
I-f the lease agreement -fails to meet the criteria
-for classi-f ication as either a direct -financing lease or as
a sales type lease, it must be classified as an operating
lease which requires the lessor to report income over the
lease term as lease payments become receivable. The
deferral of income which results from classification as an
operating lease usually makes such classification
unacceptable to the lessor. For the lessor, structuring the
lease to insure its classification as a direct financing
lease is critical since it permits the lease to be further
classified as a "true lease" for tax purposes, thereby
qualifying for various tax benefits. CRef. 51
D. TAX ACCOUNTING FDR LEASES
Apart from the financial accounting requirements for
lease classification, the IRS has established its own
standards of classification to address the income tax
ramifications of leasing agreements. In the eyes of the
Internal Revenue Service, leases are classified as either a
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"True lease" or as a "Conditional Sale lease." The true
lease recognizes the lessor as the owner o-f the leased
asset, which entitles the lessor to the tax bene-fits
associated with ownership. These tax bene-fits a.rs important
to both the lessor and lessee because they e-f -Fecti vel y lower
the lessor's cost o-f acquisition which permits the lessor to
charge lower lease rates. The lessee recognizes the lease
payments on the income statement as an expense, but does not
have to recognize -future lease payments as a liability on
the balance sheet.
The conditional sale lease, however, considers the lease
agreement to be a disguised sale and recognizes the lessee
as owner o-f the asset. The lessor must treat the
transaction as a loan. Since the lessor is not entitled to
any o-f the tax bene-fits o-f ownership, the lessor must charge
higher lease rates to recover his costs. The lessee must
a&rry the asset on the balance sheet as both an asset and a
liability, which may be unacceptable -from the lessee's
standpoi nt
.
The criteria, which govern classification as a true
lease or as a conditional sale lease are set -forth in
various IRS Revenue Rulings and Procedures. In making that
determination, the IRS stated that it would examine the
leasing agreement in terms o-f its intent and in light o-f the
-facts and circumstances existing at the time o-f the
agreement. The IRS explained that no single test or
combination o-F tests would be used in making its rulings,
but rather each case would be "decided in the light of its
particular -facts." CRe-f. S3
While the tax laws which surround leases Are lengthy and
complex, a lease generally qualifies as a true lease for tax
purposes if all the following criteria are met.
One, the estimated fair market residual value of the
leased property at the end of the lease term must equal or
exceed 20 percent of the original cost of the leased
property.
Two, the estimated remaining useful life of the leased
property at the end of the initial lease term will equal or
exceed 20 percent of the original estimated useful life of
the leased property and be at least one year.
Three, the lessee must not be entitled to purchase or
re—lease the property at the end of the lease term at a
bargain (below fair market value) price, nor may the lessor
be permitted to abandon the property at the end of the lease
term.
Four, at the beginning of the lease and at all times
during the lease term, the lessor must have a minimum
unconditional "at risk" investment equal to at least 20
percent of the cost of the leased property.
Five, the lessee ar any related party may not provide
any part of the cost of the property, nor can they lend to
the lessor any of the funds necessary to acquire the
property or guarantee any indebtedness incurred in
connection with the acquisition o-f the property.
Six, the lessor must demonstrate that it expects to
receive a pro-fit -from the leasing transaction which is apart
-from any tax benefits resulting -from the lease. CRe-f. 93
E. LEASING AND TAX IDEMNITITES.
As discussed above, the use o-f leasing as a means o-f
financing is normally predicated upon the availability o-f
tax benefits -for the lessor. The lease rate is set at a
level which, in conjunction with the tax bene-fits realized,
enable the lessor to recover the cost o-f acquisition and
provide an acceptable rate o-f return on the investment. The
lessor regards its risk as a lending risk and not a
speculative risk associated with the availability o-f tax
bene-fits. The lease agreement is normally written to
protect the lessor against the loss o-f expected tax
bene-fits. I-f the tax bene-fits are determined to be
unavailable to the lessor, the lease rate is adjusted upward
to o-f-fset any loss which the lessor would incur as a result
o-f that determination. Such tax indemnification is de-fended
under the premise that since the lessor passes a substantial
part o-f the tax bene-fits on to the lessee in the -form o-f
reduced lease rates which represents a substantial reduction
in the cost o-f long term debt -financing the lessee should
accept its share o-f the risk. CRe-f. 103
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F. THE LEVERAGED LEASE.
Direct -financing (true) leases -fall into two basic
categories: direct leases and leveraged leases. In a direct
lease, the lessor provides all the -funds necessary to
acquire the asset which will be leased. I-f the lessor
borrows to acquire the necessary -funds, he does so on a -full
recourse basis. In other words, the lessor i s at risk -for
all the -funds necessary to acquire the asset.
The leveraged lease has evolved over time -from the basic
-financial lease as the financing pro-fession has sought to
take advantage o-f the tax benefits o-f ownership without
incurring the total costs usually associated with such
ownership. Basically, the leveraged lease is a three-party
-financial leasing agreement in which the lessor borrows,
-from a third party lender on a non—recourse basis, a
substantial proportion (usually 50/C to BOY.) o-f the purchase
price o-f the asset to be leased. The loan is secured by a
-first lien on the asset, an assignment o-f the lease, and an
assignment o-f the lease rental payments. The interest rate
charged on the non-recourse loan is a -function o-f the
lessee's credit rating. CRe-f. 103
The lessor then leases the asset to the lessee -for a
stipulated series o-f lease payments. The combination o-f the
cash -flows -from the lease payments and the savings realized
-from the tax benefits associated with owning the asset
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provide the lessor with the necessary rate o-f return on his
investment. CRe-f. 113
The leveraged lease is a highly complex -financial
instrument in two respects: First, it is legally complex in
that it depends on tax laws, speci-fic tax rulings and
complicated trust and security agreements. Second, the
leveraged lease is computati onl y complex in that the dollar
amounts o-f the lease payments Are dependent upon several
-factors. CRe-f. 123
The most important tax issue inherent in the leveraged
lease is the whether the IRS will rule that the lease
qualifies as a true lease and is eligible to provide the
lessor with the anticipated tax bene-fits. I-f the IRS rules
that the leveraged lease does not quali-fy as a true lease,
but is instead a "conditional sales" agreement, then the
lessor will lose the tax bene-fits to the lessee. In such
cases, the lease agreement will usually require the lessee
to pay a higher periodic lease payment to compensate the
lessor -for the loss o-f the anticipated tax bene-fits in order
to maintain the lessor's required rate o-f return.
In 1981, the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA)
signi -f icantl y relaxed the conditions under which a lease
agreement would be considered a "true" lease by the IRS.
Prior to ERTA, the major consideration in determining
whether a lease qualified as a true lease was whether it had
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nontax economic substance. Toward that end, two speci-fic
requirements were imposed: CRe-f. 133
a. The lessor was required to make and maintain a
minimum unconditional equity investment o-f at least
207. o-f the cost o-f the asset.
b. There must exist a reasonable expectation o-f pro-fit
-from the transaction, independent o-f the tax
bene-f i ts.
The passage o-f ERTA in 1981 essentially repealed the
requirements that leases have nontax economic substance in
an attempt to increase the pro-f i tabi 1 i ty o-f struggling
businesses by offering them incentives to purchase new
equipment and machinery. These provisions permitted these
companies to sell their tax benefits resulting -from new
purchases by entering into sal e— 1 easeback transactions with
profitable companies. For lessor companies, these relaxed
rules offered attractive rates of return through the
purchase of the tax benefits of unprofitable companies.
While the ERTA provisions proved to be extremely popular
with the business community, the cost was seen to be
prohibitive by the Treasury and the ERTA provisions were
changed in 19S2 by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act (TEFRA)
. TEFRA restricted the benefits ensuing from
various leasing transactions. Significantly, TEFRA
reinstituted the pre—ERTA nontax economic substance
requirements for leveraged leases. CRef. 133
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G. TAX EXEMPT LEASING
Any acquisition o-F an asset can be viewed as a
combination of interrelated costs, bene-fits and risks which
are allocated among the owners, users and -financiers
associated with the transaction. Among these costs and
bene-fits are state and Federal income taxes associated with
the -financing arrangements o-f the transaction. Government
agencies (Federal, state and local) are, by and large,
exempt -from paying taxes and are likewise not able to take
advantage o-f various tax bene-fits accruing -from ownership,
such as depreciation deductions and deductions -for interest
paid on debt instruments. Leasing transactions, however,
can be structured so that the tax exempt entity can enjoy
the tax bene-fits it is normally prohibited -from using. One
such method is to structure the transaction in such a way as
to provide the lessor with the tax bene-fits accruing -from
ownership (investment tax credits, interest and depreciation
deductions). The lessor, in turn, passes some o-f those
bene-fits back to the tax—exempt entity in the -form o-f lower
payments than it would normally incur i -f it were to acquire
the asset through some other conventional debt -financing
arrangement. CRe-f. 143
Tax—exempt leasing has come under a great deal o-f
scrutiny -from Congress. The largest reason -for
congressional concern is the negative impact leasing by
nontaxable entities has on tax revenues. When a nontaxable
entity structures a lease in a way which generates tax
bene-fits which lower the lessor's tax liability, the Federal
Treasury, in e-f-fect, subsidizes the acquisition o-f that
asset. So, although a nontaxable entity (such as a Federal
agency) may pay a lower price -for its acquisition, the total
cost to the government may actually be more than i -f the
entity had purchased the asset instead o-f leasing it.
In 1983, Congress directed the General Accounting O-f-fice
to investigate the tax and budget implications o-f the Navy's
TAKX lease which made use o-f tax bene-fit transfers. Among
the questions raised in that request, Congress asked GAO to
report why Federal agencies were attracted to leasing as an
alternative to procurement through the normal appropriation
process. GAO reported back that Federal agencies -found
leasing attractive -for three reasons. One, it allowed them
to spread the cost o-f the asset over a longer period o-f
time. Normal procurement procedures require a Federal
agency to incur the entire cost o-f the asset when it is
purchased. Two, since lease payments are made -from
operation and maintenance -funds and not -from procurement
-funds, lease proposals are not subjected to the same level
o-f scrutiny normally associated with the procurement
process. Three, as was alluded to above, leasing can make
acquisition appear less costly because part o-f the cost is
shi-fted from the agency's budget to the Treasury in the -form
o-f reduced tax revenues. CRe-f. 153
H. LEASING OF U.S. FLAG SHIF'S
Over the past decade, leasing has become a major
financing method used by shipping companies to acquire the
use o-f shipping assets. While chartering o-f ships has
existed -for centuries, the growth o-f leasing is a recent
outgrowth o-f the growing awareness o-f the -financial power
inherent in leasing.
The tax-oriented ship lease is similar to leases -found
in other segments o-f the economy. It is designed to take
advantage o-f the various tax benefits available through
leasing. The principal reason shipping companies chose to
lease some or all their ships is the low lease rental cost
available through tax—oriented leases. Leasing companies
can o-f-fer low cost leases to users because o-f the cash -flows
created by the tax benefits o-f the transaction and pass
those benefits through to the lessee in the -form o-f lower
lease rates.
In 1980, the Maritime Administration estimated that the
equivalent interest cost o-f a tax-oriented 20 to 25 year
leveraged lease o-f a ship was 2.5 to 3.5 percent under the
long-term debt interest rate available to the lessee i -f he
attempted to buy the same ship through debt -financing.
CRef. 161
In a typical ship leasing transaction, the ship user
will have a ship built to its specifications at a shipyard
of its own choice. The user will negotiate the terms of the
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construction contract including warranties, guarantees,
delivery date and price. Once contractual agreements for
those terms Are reached, the user -finds an investment source
willing to buy the ship and lease it back to the user. The
investor buys the ship, becoming the "lessor" and enters
into a bareboat charter with the user, the "lessee", who is
also known as the charterer.
The charter agreement specifies the length of the
bareboat charter (lease term), charter hire payments (lease
rental payments) and any other terms deemed necessary
between the lessor and the lessee. The charter goes into
effect when the ship is delivered and accepted for use by
the charterer. The charter hire payments Are net to the
lessor, with the charterer paying for all costs of
operation, service, maintenance, insurance and property
taxes. A primary condition for tax purposes is that the
lessor assumes the significant risks of ownership of the
ship. In return for those risks and his initial investment,
the lessor is entitled to the tax benefits of ownership and
charter hire payments which serve to provide an agreed upon
rate of return. CRef. 163
In a ship leveraged lease, the lessor aquires ownership
through partial equity investment. The lessor finances a
good share of the remaining purchase cost (anywhere from 20
to 80%) by borrowing from other parties on a non—recourse
basis to the lessor. The leveraged lease is structured to
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enable the lessor to claim all the tax bene-fits associated
with -full ownership even though the lessor only provides a
portion o-f the capital needed to acquire the asset. The
lease is leveraged because the non-recourse debt increases
the size o-f the tax shelter relative to the lessor's equity
investment. Figure 1 provides a detailed graphic
representation o-f a typical ship leveraged lease.
The lenders in a ship lease Are usually large banks and
other institutional lenders. The loans which they make to
ship lessors are normally nan—recourse loans. Such loans
speci -f ical 1 y provide that the lessor is under no obligation
to pay of-f the loan in the event that the charterer (lessee)
de-faults. The lenders look directly to the charter hire
made by the charterer to service the debt. For that reason,
the charterer's credit rating directly a-f-fects the interest
rate charged by the lenders on the non—recourse loan made to
the lessor. CRe-f. 17: pp. 1257-12592
1 . Participants in a Maritime Leveraged Lease
As discussed in previous sections, the leveraged
ship lease is typically a complex transaction which in
principle only involves three parties. In actual practice,
however, it normally involves involves no less than seven
parties. Their -functions and characteristics ^re as -follows:
The Lessee is the party which operates the ship and
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1. An owner trust is established by the equity participants;
trust certificates are issued; and a lease agreement is signed
by the owner trustee as lessor and the lessee.
2. A security agreement is signed by the owner trustee and
the indenture trustee; a mortgage is granted on the leased
asset and the lease and rentals are assigned as security to
the indenture trustee.
3. Notes or bonds are issued by the owner trustee to the
lenders; term debt funds are paid by the lenders to the
indenture trustee; equity funds are paid by the equity
participants to the indenture trustee.
4. The purchase price is paid and title is assigned to the
owner trustee, subject to the mortgage.
5. The lease commences; rents are paid by the lessee to the
indenture trustee.
6. Debt service is paid by the indenture trustee to the lenders.
7. Revenue not required for debt service or trustees' fees is
paid to the owner trustee and, in turn, to the equity
participants.
Figure 1.
A Ship Leveraged Lease
CRe-f. 10:
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The Lessor/Owner Trustee holds title to the leased
asset -For the benefit o-f the equity participants, subject to
mortgage to the indenture trustee (see below). The
lessor /owner trustee issues bonds to the lenders, receives
cash distributions from the indenture trustee, and
distributes earnings to the equity participants.
The Equity Participants Are those parties which
invest their own -funds in partial payment o-f the purchase
price o-f the asset. They -finance the remainder o-f the
purchase through some -form o-f debt offering, typically a
bond issue. In return they receive rents after payment of
debt service, taxes and trustee fees, and claim the tax
benefits incidental to ownership of of the asset. The tax
benefits normally include an Investment Tax Credit (ITC) and
depreciation deductions.
The Debt Participants (Lenders) are typically large
financial lending institutions which provide up to BOY. of
the purchase price on a non—recourse loan basis to the
lessor or owner trustee. Their investment is normally
secured by a mortgage on the asset being leased.
The Indenture Trustee is an intermediary which
receives funds from the equity and debt participants and
purchases the asset subject to a mortgage held by the debt
participants. He also receives rent payments from the
lessee, services the debt and distributes the remaining
revenues to the owner trustee.
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The Shipyard builds the vessel, receives the
purchase price, and delivers the vessel.
The Packager is a -financial and leasing expert which
arranges the lease transaction including drawing up the
necessary legal documents and -Finds the debt and equity
participants. CRe-F. 16]
2. Lease Documentation
The agreements and legal documents necessary to
protect the interests o-f all the parties involved in a ship
leveraged lease are as complex as they are numerous. While
they must be strong enough to ensure each obligation is
en-Forcible, they must also be -Flexible to deal with
-Foreseeable economic, legal and operational events which may
arise over the li-Fe oi the charter agreement. The principal
documents include: LRe-F. 17: pp. 1261-1265D
The Participation Agreement . This is the basic
document o-F the ship leveraged lease. It provides the
guidelines ior structuring the transaction. It sets -Forth
the obligations, representations, warranties, indemnities,
and payments required o-F each o-F the parties. It speci-Fies
procedures and timetables -For ship deliveries, various
equity and charter payments. The Participation Agreement
also speci-Fies the various general and tax—related
indemnities agreed upon by the participants.
The Owner Trust and Trust Indenture Agreements .
These two agreements speci-Fy the obligations between the
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equity participants and the owner trustee which acts in
their behal-F and between the owner trustee and the indenture
trustee. The Trust Indenture explicitly describes the
disbursement o-f the charter hire payment between the various
parties to the lease transaction and their relative priority
in receiving payment or i ndemni -f i cat i on
.
The Bareboat Charter . In order to meet the IRS
requirements -for a true lease, the charter between the
lessor and lessee is a bareboat charter. The bareboat
charter requires the lessee (charterer) to pay all operating
and maintenance costs and that all charter hire payments Are
made on a "hell or high water" basis. The hell or high
water provision stipulates that the charter hire be made
regardless o-F whether the charterer used or operated the
ship during the charter period.
Other Agreements . Depending upon the complexity o-f
the transaction and the number of the parties involved, some
or all the the -following agreements may be a part o-f the
transaction. The indenture trustee may receive a -first
pre-ferred ship mortgage on the chartered ship and also be
entitled to a secured interest in the charter hire. Various
construction guarantees and security interests ^rs typical
when the vessel to be chartered must be built -first.
I . SUMMARY
This chapter has addressed the general nature o-f
leasing. The decision to lease or buy is secondary to the
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investment decision in the capital budgeting process. Leases
are classi-fied -from two standpoints: a -Financial accounting
perspective and a tax accounting perspective. The structure
and provisions o-f the lease agreement must meet certain
criteria -from both perspectives to quali-fy for the various
advantages normally associated with leasing. The leveraged
lease is a particular kind o-f lease which uses tax benefits
to provide part o-f the lessor's return on investment.
Over the past decade, leasing has become a major
financing method used by ocean shipping companies to acquire
shipping assets. The leveraged lease, in particular, has
become a papular leasing method due to its often lower
implicit financing costs. The maritime leveraged lease,
however, is a complex transaction involving several parties
and legal documents.
With the passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 and its relaxed leasing regulations, tax-exempt
entities turned to leasing as a means of financing the
acquisition of their capital assets. The Navy attempted to
make use of those liberalized rules in structuring the TAKX
leveraged lease transaction. That transaction is reviewed
in the next chapter.
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III. THE TAXK LEVERAGED LEASE
A. GENERAL
The TAKX leveraged lease transaction is undoubtedly one
o-f the most controversial Navy procurement programs o-f
recent years. Not only has it raised questions about the
adequacy o-f existing guidelines in properly evaluating lease
versus buy alternatives, but it has raised more basic
questions such as the propriety o-f the use o-f tax benefit
transfers by tax exempt entities and the lack o-f
Congressional oversight in the Department o-f Defense
leasing process.
This chapter will trace the origins o-f the TAKX program
and -follow its development to its present stage. The
assumptions, methodologies and conclusions o-f the major
studies, which have analyzed the TAKX transaction, are
presented in the -following chapter in an effort to gain
insight as to why differences exist between them.
B. TAKX - AN OVERVIEW
The TAKX Maritime Preposi ti oni ng Ships program was
authorized to provide the sealift capability for the rapid
deployment of three U. S. Marine amphibious bridgades. The
program was to encompass the construction of thirteen
special purpose rol 1 -on/rol 1 —of f container ships capable of
loading and unloading in areas without port facilities.
Acquisition o-f the TAKX vessels was originally envisioned to
be accomplished through purchase. While the need -for the
TAKX vessels was apparent, there was i nsu-F-f i ci ent
congressional support -for the program to obtain
appropriations iar their procurement. Based on the
perceived unavailability o-f procurement appropriations, the
decision was made to explore acquisition o-f the TAKX ships
through a Build and Charter program.
Leasing o-f auxiliary ships through Build and Charter
programs was not a new innovation designed solely to procure
the TAKX vessels. Build and Charter programs have been used
by the Navy since the early 1950 's to meet many o-f its
seali-ft requirements. The Military Sealift Command charters
commercial ships on a regular basis and in 19S3 had some
seventy ships under some -form o-f charter agreement.
CRe-f. 15: p. 23
In October 1981, the Dept o-f the Navy requested
proposals -for the services, on a time charter basis, o-f the
thirteen TAKX ships. The award recipients were required to
arrange -for the construction, financing and operation o-f
those vessels. All the vessels were to be privately owned
and manned by civilian crews and in all respects be U.S.
Merchant Marine commercial ships. In September 1982, the
Navy received approval -from -four Congressional oversight
commmittees to proceed with the Build and Charter program
-for the TAKX vessels.
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In 1982 and 1983 the Navy executed binding agreements
-for the time charter o-f thirteen TAKX ships and -five T—
5
tankers. This involved a $2.65 billion combined
construction cost -for the eighteen ships. In each case the
awards required the recipients to arrange -for the
construction, -financing and operation o-f the ships. Awards
were made to four companies -for the eighteen ships:
General Dynamics Corporation 5 TAKX ships
Maersk Line, Limited 5 TAKX ships
Waterman Steamship Corporation 3 TAKX ships
Ocean Shi phol di ngs, Inc. 5 T—5 tankers
Each vessel is the subject o-f a separate leveraged
lease agreement. Upon acceptance by the Navy o-f each vessel
-for service, that vessel is concurrently acquired by a group
o-f equity participants using both equity investment and the
issue o-f bonds to -finance the remaining cost o-f acquistion.
The debt is secured through the mortgage o-f the vessel and
assignment o-f -future lease payments and, as a result, is
non—recourse to the equi ty—parti cipants. The vessel is then
chartered under a Bareboat Charter to a Contractor which
delivers the vessel -for service under a Time Charter to the
Navy.
One o-f the important issues which surrounded the TAKX
transaction was to assure the availability o-f the Investment
Tax Credit (ITC) and the Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(ACRS) depreciation deduction to the equity participants.
Each tax bene-fit was subject to different set of IRS
con si derati ons.
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The ACRS depreciation deduction depended upon two
elements. First, the TAKX transaction had to quali-Fy as a
true lease under Revenue Procedure 75—21. Second, the
amount o-f the ACRS depreciation deduction depended upon the
degree of government participation in the lease. Current
law provides that i -f an asset is leased directly to a
Federal Agency, the depreciable basis of the leased asset is
limited to SO percent of its capitalized cost. However, if
the lease is between private sector entities, the
depreciable basis is increased to 100 percent of the asset's
capitalized cost.
The ITC also depended depended directly on the character
of the TAKX lease. Under current tax law, if a lease is
made directly to a Federal agency, the lessor is prohibited
from taking the Investment Tax Credit. Thus, if the Navy
chose to lease the TAKX vessels directly from the equity
participants under a bareboat charter, the ITC was lost.
The availability of the ITC and the ACRS deduction
based on 100 percent of the vessels' capitalized costs have
a significant impact on the size of the charter hire
payments to be paid by the Navy. In its report to the Navy,
the Institute for Defense Analysis determined that
without the ITC alone, annual lease payments would increase
by $4 million on a ship costing $200 million. Such an
increase represents the amount necessary to compensate the
lessor for the loss of the ITC and to assure the lessor
receives the rate o-f return guaranteed by the basic leasing
agreement. CRe-f. IS: p. 4-19D
The TAKX transaction was structured to ensure the -full
availability o-f both tax benefits. Instead o-f leasing the
ships directly -from the equity participants, the Navy
structured the deal to include a "Contractor". The
Contractor leased the TAKX ships -from the equity
participants under a bareboat charter. The Contractor, in
turn, entered into a time charter with the Navy to provide
ship services. For those services, the Navy agreed to a
charter hire payment su-f-ficient to pay the Contractor's
operating costs and his bareboat charter costs. This
structure permitted the equity participants to claim the
-full range o-f tax benefits since the true lease existed
between them and the contractor, not a government agency.
See -figure 2 -for a graphic representation o-f the TAKX
transaction structure.
C. STRUCTURE OF THE TRANSACTION
The -financing o-f each vessel is structured as
-follows: CRe-f. 19: pp. 1-9]
One, an Equity Participation Agreement is executed which
commits the equity participants to purchase through an OWNER
TRUSTEE one or more vessels -from a shipyard selected to
build the TAKX or T—5 vessels concurrently upon acceptance
















TAKX Leveraged Lease Structure
CRe-f. 28: p. A-23
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Two, the OWNER TRUSTEE, as trustee -for the equity-
participants, enters into a BAREBOAT CHARTER o-f the vessel
with a CONTRACTOR -For a period o-f 25 years -for the TAKX
vessels and 20 years -for the T—5 tankers.
Three, the CONTRACTOR has entered into a TIME CHARTER o-f
each vessel with the Navy. The Contractor assigns ail its
rights to receive Capital Hire and any payment o-f
Termination Value under the Time Charter to the Owner
Trustee. The Navy also agreed to the -following:
a. The assignment o-f the Capital Hire any payment o-f
Termination Value under the Time Charter to
the OWNER TRUSTEE, and
b. The reassignment o-f those monies to an INDENTURED
TRUSTEE who will act on behal-f o-f the Bondholders
(the lenders who have purchased the bonds to -finance
part o-f the acquisition costs o-f the vessel) to
secure the bonds related to each vessel and to insure
their redemption and payment.
Four, the Bondholders Are provided a First Fre-f erred
Ship Mortgage, through the Indentured Trustee, on the vessel
as a -first lien on that vessel.
D. SOLICITATION OF EQUITY PARTICIPATION
Each o-f the awardees in the TAKX and T—5 programs
selected a -financial advisor to arrange the equity and debt
investments required -for each program. The awardees and
their respective advisors arez CRe-f. 20]
General Dynamics Salomon Brothers, Inc.
Maersk Lines Morgan Guaranty Trust
Waterman Steamship Citibank and Manu-f actures
Hanover Leasing Corp.
Ocean Shipholdings Shearson Leasing Corp.
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To ensure a coordinated approach to the solicitation o-f
equity investments, each potential equity source was
required to operate through one o-f these -four advisors.
Potential equity investors, identi-fied by the advisors, were
invited to submit proposals -for participation in the
programs. Each advisor was given the exclusive right to
work with the potential equity participants in developing
proposals -for submission to the Contractors and the Navy.
No other investment group was authorized to submit proposals
or to solicit any potential equity source other than those
identi-fied by the advisors. CRe-f. 203
E. CHARTER HIRE PAYMENTS
The Charter Hire payments to be paid by the Navy -for the
TAKX ships consist o-f two parts. One part, the Operating
Hire compensates the ship operator -for the day to day
operation o-f the ship. The operating hire covers such
expenses as manning, -fuel, cargo handling, port charges and
expenses, maintenance, repair and other normal operational
expenses. These costs Are incurred regardless o-f whether
the TAKX ships are leased or purchased. For that reason,
operating hire payments s.re ignored in the lease versus
purchase cost comparisons.
The other part o-f the Charter Hire payment is the
Capital Hire payment. The capital hire payment is analogous
to a lease payment. The capital hire reimburses the
lessor's cost o-f acquisition and provides a satisfactory
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rate o-F return on the lessor's investment. Capital hire
rates are calculated to take into account all -financial
aspects o-f the charter transaction.
Capital hire rates -form the competitive basis -from which
the Navy selects the TAKX equity participants. Prospective
equity participants submitted capital hire rate bids based
on complex calculations which took into account the
-following minimum elements: CRe-f.203
a. Ship Delivery Provisions:
(1) Capitalized costs o-f ship construction
(2) Time to delivery a-fter contract award
(3) Time o-f delivery in relation to lessors
tax year
b. Charter Provisions:
(1) Total length o-f charter term
(2) Number and timing o-f capital hire payments
c. Tax Provisions:
(1) Availability o-f ITC
<2) Availability o-f ACRS depreciation rates
<3) Depreciable basis o-f asset (1007. or less)
(4) Lessor's tax rate
d. Debt/Equity Participation:
(1) Percent o-f lessor's equity participation
(2) Percent o-f lender's participation
e. Debt Provisions:
(1) Interest rate on lessor's long—term loans
<2) Number and timing o-f debt service payments
(3) Loan commitment -fees
-f . Lessor's required rate o-f return on investment;
g. Residual value o-f the ships at the end o-f the charter;




(1) Lease transaction costs
(2) Closing costs




The basic capitalized costs represent the o-f-ficial
costs o-f constructing each ship and Are speci-Fied in each
Agreement to Charter between the Navy and a contractor and
include the -following: CRe-f. 19: pp. 13-1S3
Fixed Costs which include: (1) the cost o-f
construction o-f new ships; or the cost o-f acquistion and
conversion o-f existing ships; and (2) the cost o-f inspection
and supervision during that construction or reconstruction.
Other basic capitalized costs included legal,
financial and consulting -fees incurred during construction.
Also included were a third group o-f costs incurred in
arranging the interim and long-term debt necessary to
-finance the construction o-f the ships. Those costs
included: (1) the cost o-f interim (construction) loans; (2)
the interest on existing debt during conversion o-f existing
vessels; (3) debt placement -fees; and (4) permanent loan
(bond) commitment -fees.
2. Termi nati on .
The Navy may elect not to renew the Time Charter as
to each Vessel at the end o-f its basic term or any renewal
period or at any time after the Basic term -for the
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convenience o-f the Government. I -f it does so, the
Government is obligated to pay a Termination Value (net o-f
sale proceeds received) calculated to pay the outstanding
Bonds issued to acquire the vessel and to return to the
equity participants their investment plus the agreed upon
rate o-f return to date after taking into account any net tax
liablility associated with the termination. CRe-f. 19: p. 283
3. Adjustments to Capital Hire
The Capital Hire rates ^re stipulated in each ship's
Agreement to Charter, and Are subject to adjustment -for a
number o-f items including changes in the amount o-f basic
capitalized costs, or in the anticipated delivery date o-f
the ship. Adjustments are also made when changes occur in
the anticipated interest rate payable on the bonds or -for
changes in the amortization schedule -for the bonds.
Adjustments are also made -for changes in the Internal
Revenue code, and other applicable o-f-ficial regulations, and
changes in the anticipated tax benefits associated with the
transaction. CRe-f. 19: pp. 19-243
In arriving at a Capital Hire -figure, the equity
participants were required to deposit with the Navy on a
"confidential — business sensitive" basis the information
and assumptions that were used by the equity participant in
computing the Capital Hire rates that formed the basis for






4. Tax Conditions Precedent
In its guidance -for the solicitation o-f bids for
equity participants, the Navy outlined the tax rulings upon
which potential participants were to base their proposals.
The major rulings the Navy sought to obtain -from the IRS
included the below listed items. CRe-f. 20: pp. 1.6 - I.9H
A ruling that the bareboat charter between the Owner
Trustee (representing the equity participants) and the
contractor was a lease and that the Trust was considered the
lessor and the contractor the lessee, and that the lease
payments constituted rent. Also that the Trust would be
treated as the purchaser, owner and lessor of the vessel.
Other assumptions included that the the Trust would
be entitled to accelerated cost recovery deductions; that
the bonds sold to finance the vessel constituted
indebtedness for which the Trust would be entitled to
interest deductions. The transaction was not to be subject
to the "finance lease" provisions of the Revenue Code. Also
the following conditions concerning the Investment Tax
Credit were to apply: CRef. 20: p. I.9D
a. Vessels to be converted will qualify as "new property"
entitling the Trust to the ITC and ACRS.
b. The Time Charter will be considered a service
agreement rather than a lease or sublease, and that
the vessel (5) will not constitute property that is
used by the Government for purposes of the Revenue
Code.
5. Other Conditions Precedent
The major consideration in this area was receipt o-f
an opinion o-f the General Counsel o-f the Navy con-firming the
"-full -faith and credit" nature o-f the Navy's obligations
under the Time Charter and compliance with existing laws and
regulations, together with certificates o-f the Comptroller
o-f the Military Seal i -ft Command or the Comptroller o-f the
Navy con-firming that required amounts -for the payment o-f
Charter Hire liability druing the Basic Term o-f the Time
Charter have been obligated in the Navy Industrial Fund and
required amounts for the payment o-f termination liability
have been obligated in the current Operation and
Maintenance, Navy, appropriation account, in accordance with
all applicable laws and regulations.
6. Special Federal Tax Benefits Indemnity
The Navy promised to provide the equity participants
with indemnities for the loss of following Federal income
tax benefits: CRef. 20: pp. I. 11 - 1.143
a. Current cost recovery deductions for Federal income
tax purposes will be equal to 95/i (or 1007. if so
elected) of Basic Capitalized Costs less amortizable
fees and expenses; and
b. Current deductions for Federal income income tax
purposes determined in accordance with the Trust's
method of accounting for interest on the Bonds after
the delivery date; and the Investment Tax Credit (ITC)
will equal 107. (or BY. if so elected) of the excess of
Basic Capitalized Costs over amortizable fees and
expenses.
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The Navy agreed to indemnify each equity participant
against loss or recapture of the Federal income tax bene-fits
decribed above if such loss or recapture occurred as the
direct result of the Time Charter being treated as a lease
under existing law or under any legislation enacted into law
during the current session of Congress.
G. TAKX IMPACT ON NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND
The TAKX charters are paid by the Military Sealift
Command through the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) . The NIF is
one of five working capital funds within the Department of
Defense. A working capital fund is a revolving fund which
is used as a source of financing for work that will be paid
for by a customer of an activity after the completion of the
job. The NIF is used as a management tool to provide a
means of controlling costs and monitoring budget
performance. The NIF receives the majority of its funding
through the annual Defense Budget as part of the Navy's
Operations and Maintenance (0?<MN) appropriation. The NIF is
composed of fifty different activities, one of which is the
Military Sealift Command.
The NIF operates under a simple concept. As funded
customer orders are received by the various NIF activities,
the NIF uses its resources to finance the costs necessary to
procure the services or material needed to support the
customer's order. The NIF activities then bill their
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customers -for the costs the NIF incurred in providing the
services or material.
Overall NIF management is provided by the Comptroller o-f
the Navy (NAVCOMPT) who has the responsibility under Section
3679 o-f the Revised Statutes (30 USC 665) to avoid over
—
obligation o-f NIF -funds in excess o-f those appropriated.
Speci-f ical ly , NAVCOMPT must ensure that the total value o-f
outstanding obligations o-f the NIF do not exceed the
algebraic sum o-f unobligated NIF funds and the unbilled
balance o-f NIF customer orders. NAVCOMPT must also ensure
that the total NIF cash balance is not less than zero.
CRe-f. 21: pp. H.3 - H.7D
The long term lease o-f Navy ships presents a special
problem. No government -funding provision exists to cover
future charter obligations. The Military Seali-ft Command is
required to obligate NIF -funds according to the length o-f
the charter. That is, i -f the charter period is -for 5 years,
MSC must obligate the entire 5 year cost o-f charter. In
addition, most charter agreements include a early
termination penalty which requires MSC to set aside
contingent -funds, normally 10 percent o-f the outstanding
termination liability. Navy ship construction -funds (SCN)
could be used to ca^/er these long term obligations, but that
would require the Navy to give up new construction -funds in
the amount o-f the leasing obligation. O&MN -funds cannot be
used -for long term obligations, because they Brs
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appropriated annually. The Navy has opted to commit its
long term leasing obligations against the unobligated NIF
balance. CRe-f. IS: p. 6-91
The impact o-f these MSC obligations on the total NIF is
signi-f icant . At the beginning o-f FY 1985, the unobligated
balance o-f the NIF was •$392 million. The MSC portion o-f
that balance was a negati ve $2.2 billion. In other words,
MSC was obligated -for $2.2 billion more than it had -funds or
unbilled charges. CRe-f. 223
As alluded to above, the reason -for the huge negative
MSC unobligated balance is the nature o-f the obligation
required to record a ship charter. MSC is required to
obligate NIF -funds -for the entire length o-f a ship's
charter. In many cases, those charters run up to -five
years. In addition, MSC is also required to obligate NIF
-funds -for part o-f the early termination penalty which is
required by most charter agreements. MSC is only able to
bill its customers, who use the charter vessels, -for one
year o-f those services at a time. Thus MSC incurs up to
-five years worth o-f charter costs plus a portion o-f the
early termination penalty, but is only able to recover one
year's cost o-f chartering and nothing -for early termination
penalties. These obligation requirements result in MSC '
s
unobligated NIF account being overdrawn by a significant
amount.
Given that backdrop, the thirteen vessel TAKX program
with its -five—year charters and substantial early
termination penalties presented the Navy with a signi-ficant
-funding problem. The NIF account will be required to absorb
an additional yearly charter cost of about $218 million. In
addition, the NIF must also provide for a 10 percent
contingency fund on the outstanding early termination
penalty which will require another $130 to $320 million
(this is a cumulative, not an annual requirement).
CRef.18: pp. 5-5 S< 6-12]
To avoid any possible RS 3679 violations, the Navy
recently took two actions. One, it directed MSC to only
enter into single year charters where possible. Two, early
termination contingencies were obligated against the entire
O&MN appropriation, rather than the NIF account. CRef. 22D
H. CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND INITIATIVES
Leasing by tax—exempt entities became a source of great
concern to Congress in 1983 and 1984. Congress' concern
centered on two issues: (1) the magnitude of the loss of
tax revenues resulting from the transfer of tax benefits
from tax—exempt entities to taxable entities; and (2) the
lack of Congressional oversight and control of leasing by
Federal agencies like the Department of Defense.
In an attempt to stem the loss of tax revenues resulting
from leasing by tax—exempt entities two bills were proposed
in 1983. The House version, titled the "Government
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Leasing Act of 1983" H.R. 3110, was authored by Congressman
Pickle <D—Ohio) . It proposed to reduce the depreciation
deductions and investment tax credits available in leases
which involve tax-exempt entities. The Senate version,
titled the "Government Lease Financing Re-form Act o-f 1983"
S. 1564, was introduced by Senators Dole, Metzenbaum,
Durenberger and Grassley. It also proposed to reduce the
tax benefits available when tax—exempt entities enter into
leasing agreements. The Senate bill also took aim at the
service versus use issue in leases by providing specific
criteria on which to base a determination. The present
status o-f these bills in unknown. In 1984, Congress passed
the De-ficit Reduction Act o-f 1984, which accomplished many
o-f the objectives o-f the earlier House and Senate bills
described above.
The Deficit Reduction Act o-f 1984 (DRA) provided
speci-fic rules governing leasing by tax-exempt entities.
DRA significantly restricts the tax-benefits, primarily the
investment tax credit and the accelerated cost recovery
system (ACRS)
,
previously available to lessors who leased
assets to tax-exempt entities. DRA stipulates that real
property which is leased must be depreciated using the
straight-line method over a 40-year period. DRA further
provided guidelines for determining whether a lease
constitutes a use or service arrangement. CRef. 23D
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The e-f-fect o-f these bills will be to essentially prevent
-future lease transactions such as the TAKX transaction. The
leveraged lease is dependent upon tax benefits to provide
the lessor with an acceptable rate o-f return, while
providing the lessee with a lease rate that is below his
normal cost o-f -financing. The De-ficit Reduction Act o-f 1984
greatly limits the availability o-f those tax benefits when
tax exempt entities lease assets.
Congress also moved to gain greater control of long-term
leasing by the Department of Defense. The 1983 and 1984
Defense Authorization Acts were amended to permanently
require the services to obtain Congressional authorization
before entering into long—term leases for any aircraft or
naval vessel. Long-term was defined as any lease, charter,
service contract, or conditional sale agreement the term of
which was five or more years, or more than one—half the
useful life of the asset. The services were further
directed to provide in their requests for authorization to
lease or charter an analysis of the cost to the government,
including lost tax revenues, of leasing compared with the
cost of direct procurement. Congress also directed the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the
Secretary of the Treasury to jointly issue guidelines for
determining under what circumstances the Department of
Defense could lease or charter rather than directly
procuring aircraft or naval vessels. Congress further
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directed the Secretary o-f De-fense to provide Congress with a
listing o-f all leases, charters, service contracts and
conditional sales agreements whose terms were -for one year
or longer which were to be -funded either directly or
indirectly by the De-fense budget. CRe-f. 243
I . SUMMARY
Chapter III has presented an overview o-f the TAKX
transaction. Many of the basic issues, which have stirred
much o-f the controversy surrounding the TAKX transaction,
were also addressed. The nature o-f the Navy's tax indemnity
guarantees were detailed. The significant impact o-f MSC
leasing on the Navy Industrial Fund was also presented.
The Congressional initiatives to control leasing by
tax—exempt entities and by the Department o-f De-fense, in
particular, were discussed.
Finally, the structure o-f the transaction and its
principal terms were provided to -facilitate the reader's
understanding o-f the 1 ease-versus-buy cost studies which are
analyzed in the next chapter.
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IV. LEASE VERSUS PURCHASE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES
In February 19S3, the Joint Committee on Taxation
presented a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight o-f the
House Committee on Ways and Means, which was sharply
critical o-f the leasing aspects o-f the Navy's TAKX build and
charter program. That report asserted that the decision to
lease instead o-f purchase the TAKX vessels would result in
the Government paying, on the average, about $21 million
(11.7 percent) more per ship. The total excess cost o-f
leasing over purchase -for the entire TAKX program was
estimated to be $270 million. CRe-f. 25: p. 21
The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) report was in
stark contrast to earlier cost-analysis studies initiated by
the Navy and the Department o-f De-fense which had concluded
that leasing through a Build and Charter program was
si gni -f i cantl y less costly than a purchase program on a
discounted basis. The most detailed o-f these reports was
written by the Navy's leasing agent, Argent Group, Ltd.,
which provided analysis that chartering each TAKX ship would
enable the government to save about $29 million or 16.1
percent when compared with a direct purchase. In total,
Argent projected that leasing would save the government
almost $381 million. CRe-f. 26: p. 33
In June 1983, -further attention was drawn to the TAKX
transaction by Forbes magazine. Forbes was sharply critical
o-f the terms of the Navy's deal. The Forbes article
specifically criticized the "unusually attractive" tax
benefits and the guarantee of an "impressive 11.745 percent
after tax rate of return" given to the equity participants
in the lease transaction. The article also criticized the
Navy's agreement to indemnify the equity participants
against the loss of certain tax benefits. CRef 273
This chapter will examine the various cost—anal yses of
the TAKX program and detail the different assumptions and
methodologies which have helped to precipitate the
controversy described above. The intent of this review is
not to judge which analysis or methodolgy was the best.
Rather, this chapter will attempt to clearly present the
issues which cloud any analysis of this sort. Cogent
arguments Are made for the positions taken in each of the
studies. In the end, however, one must reconcile the
question of whether the TAKX leveraged lease is more costly
to the government than a purchase would have been. That
reconciliation, however, is also much like an assessment of
beauty—it lies in the eyes of the beholder.
While this chapter will analyze the various
lease—versus-buy cost comparisons, it is important to
remember one salient fact. All of these analyses assume the
presence of a purchase option. The basis for the criticisms
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leveled by JCT and GAO is that a purchase alternative to
acquire the TAKX ships existed. As was noted in Chapter
III, however, Congress had declined to appropriate -Funds -for
the purchase o-f those ships and instructed the Navy to
pursue other means to meet its Marine rapid deployment
support responsibilities- In light o-f the absence o-f a
purchase alternative, the validity o-f a 1 ease—versus-buy
cost comparison becomes questionable.
While assumptions di-f-fer among the studies, the basic
structure and de-finition o-f costs are the same. The Navy
obtains the services o-f a vessel which is operated by a
third party. The vessel is bareboat chartered to the
operator who in turn time charters the vessel to the Navy.
The Navy pays a charter hire payment which is divided into
two components: (1) the capital hire, which repays the debt
and equity -financing provided by the lessor and debt
participants plus interest and an agreed upon rate o-f
return; and (2) the operating hire, which pays the operator
-for his services in operating the vessel for the Navy.
The lessor's rate o-f return is derived from two sources:
(1) the excess of the capital hire payment over that amount
necessary to repay principal and interest due to the debt
participants; and (2) the tax benefits available to the
lessor accruing from ownership of the vessel (depreciation
and interest deductions, and investment tax credit). Under
such an arrangement, it is theoretically possible for the
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lessor to o-f-fer low-cost -financing in the -form o-f reduced
capital hire payments to a lessee who is not in a position
to take advantage o-f the tax bene-fits. Such a lease
arrangement can be viewed as a loan which bears an e-f-fective
interest rate below that which would normally be available
to the lessee under a conventional loan arrangement.
CRe-f. 283
A. LEASE VERSUS PURCHASE ANALYTICAL METHODS.
The decision to lease or buy an asset requires the
analyst to compare the costs and bene-fits associated with
each -form o-f acquisition. Any such comparison must take
into account the timing di -f -f erences in the cash -flows
associated with each o-f the two alternatives. The total
cost o-f leasing is the sum o-f the series o-f periodic
payments made o'ver the li-fe o-f the lease term. The cost o-f
buying depends upon whether the asset is purchased with or
without debt. I-f the owner is able to buy the asset without
having to borrow, the cost o-f the asset is simply its
purchase price. I-f the owner must borrow in order to -finance
the purchase, then the real cost o-f the asset is the sum o-f
the down payment and the principal and interest payments
made over the li-fe o-f the debt instrument used to help
-finance the acquisition.
To make a meaning-ful comparison between the lease or buy
(or borrow) alternatives, analysts must reconcile these
timing differences because o-f the time value o-f money. More
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simply put, the value of a dollar paid at the beginning of a
contract term is greater than a dollar paid at the end of a
contract term. The di-f-ference is evaluated as equivalent to
the interest which can be earned on money that is held
rather than spent and the e-f-fects o-f in-Flation.
Analysts account -for such timing di -f -f erences using
present value calculations which provide the value now o-f a
series o-f payments to be made periodically in the -future.
The most -frequently used lease versus buy analysis is the
Net Present Value approach which requires the decision maker
to: CRe-f. 293
a. Determine the amount and timing o-f the periodic costs
to be incurred under the purchase and lease
al ternati ves.
b. Select an appropriate discount rate which re-flects the
user's cost of capital in acquiring the asset.
c. Discount the cost streams determined in step 1 above
and select the alternative which has the lowest
present value total.
While the process appears simple enough, in practice
such analysis is complicated by several -factors. First,
There is no universally accepted method -for determining an
appropriate discount rate. Arguments abound -for using any
one o-f a myriad o-f methods -for discount rate determination
including: the incremental cost o-f debt, the cost o-f equity,
the weighted average cost of capital and a number o-f risk
adjusted and tax adjusted variants o-f these methods.
Second, The identification of those costs and benefits
to be included in the analysis. Some elements are easily
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recognized as certain to occur, but are very di-f-ficult to
specify in exact monetary terms. Other elements a.re less
certain, such as the residual values, and equally di-f-ficult
to speci-fy in dollar terms.
Given those vagaries, it not suprising that the various
analysts who have studied the TAKX lease versus purchase
decision reached di-f-ferent conclusions. This chapter will
look at -four o-f the principal studies which analyzed the
TAKX acquisition. Two o-f them, the Navy sponsored Argent
Group analysis and the Department o-f De-fense sponsored
Institute o-f De-fense Analysis study, concluded leasing the
TAKX ships was less expensive on a net present value basis
than buying. Two other studies, one by the Joint Committee
on Taxation and the other by the General Accounting Office,
arrived at the opposite conclusion. The results of these
analyses, and their underlying assumptions and methodologies
are examined below.
B. NAVY AND DOD COST-ANALYSES
The Navy initiated two cost-analysis studies to assess
the costs of a TAKX Build and Charter program. The first
study, conducted by the public accounting firm Coopers and
Lybrand, established the feasibility of using a leveraged
lease to procure the TAKX ships. In April 1982, the Navy
selected Argent Group, Ltd., after competitive bid, to
assist the Navy as "packager" in structuring and
implementing the TAKX leveraged lease. As a first step in
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that direction, Argent conducted a more detailed analysis o-f
the TAKX leveraged lease. This study assessed the costs to
be borne not only by the Navy, but also by the Treasury and
the Government as a whole.
The Argent study employed a sophisticated commercial
leasing model called the Lease Analysis System (LAS) to
predict the various cash -flows and rates o-f return to the
participants. Those costs were discounted at various rates
including the OMB directed rate o-f 10 percent and compared
against the costs o-f an outright purchase. Argent
determined that leasing enjoyed a cost advantage at discount
rates above 77.. That is, as the discount rate was increased
above 77., the present value cost o-f a Charter became less
and less expensive than an outright purchase. Conversely,
Argent noted that as the discount rate decreased, the
present value cost o-f the Charter alternative increased. In
other words, the charter alternative was more expensive on a
present value basis than the purchase alternative -for
discount rates below 77.. [Re-f. 28: pp. 11-153
Argent continued its analysis by pointing out that the
discount rate used in present value analysis should re-flect
the expected cost o-f borrowing money over the period o-f the
investment. At the time o-f the study the government's cost
o-f borrowing was about 14 percent. Thus, Argent concluded
that it was more cost e-f-fective to charter the TAKX vessels
than to purchase them. Figure 3 graphically depicts the
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effect o-f the discount rate on the present value costs o-f













E-f-fect o-f Discount Rate on
Cost Savings of Charter vs. Purchase
CRe-f, 28: p. 123
The conclusions reached by the Argent analysis were
supported by a cost-analysis conducted -for the Department o-f
Defense by the Institute o-f Defense Analysis (IDA). The IDA
study also addressed the effects of long-term interest rates
on the present value of a long-term lease. IDA noted that a
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decrease in interest rates precipitated a corresponding
decrease in the amount o-f the periodic lease payments. Thi?
reduction re-flected the lower -financing costs available to
the equity participants. Thus, on a discounted (present
value) basis, a decline in long—term interest rates
particularly -favored leasing. IDA also noted that several
variables impacted the discounted value o-f the lease stream,
IDA summarized its sensitivity analysis o-f those variables
in table 1 below: CRe-f. IS: p. S-133
TABLE 1
Summary o-f Sensitivity Analysis
EFFECT ON LEASE PAYMENT
IF VALUE OF VARIABLE:
VARIABLE: INCREASES DECREASES
Rate o-f Return to Lessor Increase Decrease
Interest Rate on Long-Term Debt Increase Decrease
Discount Rate Decrease Increase
Lender Tax Rate Decrease Increase
Percent o-f Owner's Equity Increase Decrease
Investment Tax Credit ( ITC) Decrease [1) Increase (2)
1 - ITC allowed
2 — ITC not allowed
The major premise which the Argent methodology adopted
-for its comparison o-f the costs o-f purchase and lease was to
account -for the tax revenues as well as the tax expenditures
which resulted -from the leasing option. Tax expenditures
consist o-f the loss in tax revenues collected by the
Treasury due to the lessor taking advantage o-f interest and
depreciation deductions and the investment tax credit.
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Argent argued, that since tax expenditures were accounted
-for, it was also necessary to take into account the revenue
gain to the Treasury -from the taxes on the income resulting
from the capital hire payments received by the lessor,
interest received by the lenders, transaction -fees received
by the various parties to the transaction, and earnings on
the tax de-ferrals (assuming a sinking -fund treatment o-f
those tax de-ferrals). CRe-f. 25: pp. 5-7:
Proceeding under that assumption and discounting at
10.25 percent annually, Argent determined that leasing was
$29.3 million less costly than purchase o-f a TAKX ship
costing $182.4 million. See Table 2 -for a detailed
breakdown o-f the costs. CRe-f. 25: p. 43
Table 2
Argent Cost Comparison o-f the
Lease Versus Buy Alternatives
(-figures in $ million)
CRe-f. 253
NAVY TREASURY
. ITEM ACCT ACCT
Cost, New Ship -182.4



















C. CONGRESSIONAL COST ANALYSIS
In its report to the House Committee on Ways and Means,
the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) took exception to the
Argent assumptions and methodologies. They reasoned that
whenever the Government leases, its cost o-f capital consists
o-f the rental payments and the net tax bene-fits provided to
the lessor. JCT reasoned that -for a lessor to be willing to
enter into a lease the combination o-F rental payments and
tax bene-fits had to be large enough to cover his cost o-f
capital which consisted o-f: the decline in value o-f the
asset as it ages, interest and principal payments to the
lenders -for the loans used to help purchase the ship, a rate
o-f return on the equity provided by the investors to buy the
ship, and -fees paid to third parties to structure and
implement the lease. The JCT report further reasoned that
the rate o-f interest paid by the lessor and the rate o-f
return expected by the equity participants generally exceeds
the interest rate on government debt because o-f the
Government's superior credit. The JCT concluded, therefore,
that whenever the Government leases, its compensates the
lessor -for greater -financing costs than the Government would
have borne had it borrowed -funds and purchased the ship.
CRe-f. 25: p. 1811
Proceeding on that basis, the JCT developed its
methodology which took the position that it was not correct
to count as an inflow to the Treasury the income taxes which
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will be paid by the debt participants on the interest they
receive -from the loans they have made to the owner /l essor
.
The JCT reasoned that to count such tax revenues would
require the similar tax revenues arising -from the holders o-f
Treasury debt borrowed to purchase the ship to be counted
for consistent comparison. For that reason, the JCT chose
not to count tax revenues arising -from either transaction.
Using those assumptions, the JCT determined that leasing o-f
the same ship presented above in the Argent analysis would
actually cost the Government $20.8 million or 11.7 percent
more than purchasing the ship outright. For a detailed
breakdown o-f that calculation see Table 3. CRef. 25: pp.
19-213
Table 3
JCT Cost Comparison o-f the
Lease Versus Buy Alternatives
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In June 1983, the General Accounting O-f-fice issued their
analysis o-f the TAKX transaction in response to a
Congressional inquiry requesting GAO review the practices
and procedures -followed by the Government in its long-term
leasing o-f capital equipment. The GAO analysis closely
paralleled the methodologies used by JCT and its -findings
were, not suprisingly, similar. GAO concluded that leasing
the TAKX ship described in the Argent and JCT reports would
cost about -£12.5 million more than i -f the Government bought
the same ship. CRe-f. 15: p. 163
D. ANALYSIS OF COST DIFFERENCES
Although the Navy sponsored Argent analysis and the
Congress initiated JCT analysis o-f the TAKX program based
their analyses on the same ship (-for the record, Maersk
Vessel Number Three), they arrived at vastly different
conclusions. As we saw in the previous sections, Argent
concluded that the leasing alternative was $29.3 million
less expensive than the purchase alternative. JCT, on the
other hand, arrived at the opposite conclusion and reported
that leasing was $20.8 million more expensive than the
purchase alternative. The di-f-fernce between the two is a
significant $50.1 million. See Table 4 below.
Underlying those conclusions were several di-f-fering
assumptions. First, the two studies chose to treat the
taxes arising -from the transaction in different manners. The
Argent analysis chose to include the tax revenues as well as
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the tax expenditures resulting -from the TAKX transaction.
The JCT analysis chose only to count the tax expenditures.
Second, the residual value was treated di -f -f erentl y . The
Argent analysis chose to exclude it while JCT included it in
their analysis. Third, the studies disagreed on whether the
costs o-f structuring and implementing the leveraged lease
transaction should be included in the cost o-f leasing the
ship. JCT chose to recognize those costs, while Argent did
not. Finally, the two studies disagreed on the -fundamental
issue o-f the size o-f the lease equity market and the impact
o-f the TAKX transaction on that market and, by extension, on
Federal tax revenues.
Table 4
Reconciliation o-f Argetn and JCT Report Differences
(figures in $ million)
CRe-f. 263
Item AMOUNT
Treatment o-f Tax Revenues $39.7
Treatment o-f Residual Value 5.1
Treatment o-f Transaction Costs 4.2




Treatment o-f Tax Revenues
JCT objected to the inclusion o-f $39.7 million in
tax revenues which Argent projected would result -from the
TAKX transaction. The basis -for that objection centered on
the issue o-f whether is was appropriate to include such tax
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re-flows resulting -from government outlays in determing the
cost o-f an asset acquired by the government. Cost analysis
can be conducted on a pre—tax or an after-tax basis. The
pre—tax method discounts be-fore—tax outlays at a be-fore—tax
discount rate, while the a-fter-tax method discounts
a-fter-tax outlays at an a-fter-tax discount rate.
For capital budgeting purposes, OMB requires
government agencies to discount multi-year outlay programs
at a speci-fied pre—tax rate. OMB choses a discount rate
which reflects the government's pretax cost o-f funds: the
prevailing interest rate on government bonds. Use o-f the
pre—tax rate theoretically permits agencies to disregard the
tax revenues which would flow back to the government in the
form of taxes on interest paid to the holders of government
debt when evaluating the cost of a multiyear program. Thus,
in JCT's view, the inclusion of tax revenues resulting from
the TAKX transaction constituted "double-counting" and
resulted in underestimating the actual cost of the lease
when comparing it to a purchase. CRef. 25: p. 21 1
Argent responded to this objection by pointing out
that the JCT position was only valid when comparing the TAKX
leveraged lease with an "equivalent loan" alternative in
acquiring the TAKX ships. The JCT analysis made the
assumption that the ships would be procured using 100/1 debt
financing by the Treasury. Under that assumption, tax
revenues would be generated from interest on the debt in a
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purchase just as tax revenues would be generated in a lease.
Argent, on the other hand, made the opposite assumption that
the ships would be procured using a cash purchase with no
Treasury debt. Under the no debt assumption, inclusion o-f
tax revenues resulting -From TAKX is a proper reduction in
the cost o-f a lease since those revenues do not exist under
the no debt purchase.
Argent took the "doubl e—counti ng" issue one step
-further by correctly pointing out that neither o-f the
analyses had properly accounted -for the tax revenues
resulting -from the purchase or lease alternatives. With
today's budget deficits, government purchases are -funded
partially -from tax revenues and the remainder -from Treasury
bonds. Proceeding under that assumption, Argent calculated
the increase in tax revenues resulting -from leasing TAKX
over a purchase to be $24.6 million. CRe-f. 26: pp. 5—73
2. Treatment o-f Residual Value
Accounting -for the residual value o-f an asset when
evaluating a lease versus buy analysis is important -for two
reasons. First, in order to properly compare the
alternatives, the user must end up in the same enconomic
position under the lease or the purchase decision. I-f the
user buys the asset, he can presumably recoup some o-f its
cost by selling it when he has finished using the asset. If
the user leases the asset, however, the user forgoes any
such residual benefit. In order to make the two
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alternatives comparable, the residual value should be
deducted -from the cost o-f the purchase alternative.
Residual value is important -for a second -fundamental
reason. The size o-f the lease rental payment is directly
a-f-fected by the amount o-f residual value assumed -for the
asset at the end o-f the lease term. Lease payments, in
conjunction with available tax bene-fits, are set at a rate
to enable the lessor to recoup the cost o-f acquiring the
asset and to provide an acceptable rate o-f return on the
investment in the transaction. I-f the lessor assumes some
level o-f residual value at the end o-f the lease term, the
cost o-f acquisition is lowered and the size o-f the lease
rental payments (assuming no change in available tax
bene-fits) are set accordingly. I-f the lessor assumes zero
residual value at the end o-f the lease term, the lease
rental rates must increase to re-flect the higher cost o-f
acqui sti on
.
Thus, on the -first count, the JCT inclusion o-f a
residual value was correct. The amount o-f the residual
value, however, is open to discussion in view o-f the
anticipated 25 year lease term. Argent conceded that some
residual value should be assumed, but argued that the
-figure used in the JCT report was overly optimistic. Argent
assigned a residual value o-f 2.07. o-f original cost, which was
consistent with IRS requirement that the lessor show that
there will be at least an estimated 207. residual value and
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use-ful life at the end o-f the lease term. Discounting that
amount over the li-fe o-f the lease, Argent concluded that it
reduced the advantage of leasing over purchasing by $1.7
million, -from 29.3 million to $27.6 million. CRef. 25:
pp. 19-203
The impact o-f the zero residual value assumption on
the size o-f the lease payments and the lessor's rate of
return, however, was not addressed by either o-f the reports.
I-f the lease proposals the Navy received -from prospective
lessors assumed zero residual value at the end o-f the lease
term, then the lease payments reflected a higher acquisition
cost than i-f some residual value had been assumed. Given
those higher lease rental payments and assuming that a
residual value does exist at the end o-f the lease term, the
lessor recovers that residual value twice: once in the -form
o-f higher lease rental payments and again in the -form o-f the
residual value which he realizes upon disposing o-f the asset
at the end o-f the lease term. This issue will be discussed
in greater detail in Chapter VI.
3. Treatment o-f Transactions Costs
The JCT analysis reduced the cost o-f purchasing the
vessel under study by $4.2 million to reflect the avoidance
of those costs thought to be unique to the leasing
alternative. Argent conceded that the transaction costs of
a purchase would be lower than those of a leveraged lease,
but argued that the Navy received certain benefits such as
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construction cost overrun protection which were worth at
least *4.2 million. CRe-f. 25: p. 193
While there is a certain amount o-f merit in Argent's
argument, it -fails to take into account that each TAKX ship
construction contract provided -for a $5 million "Changes
Fund" which was designed to carver changes or extras deemed
necessary during construction which o-ften cause cost
overruns. CRe-f. 19: p. 7] Would a purchase contract have
included such a provision -for changes? I-f the answer is no,
then the Argent position has little validity. I-f the answer
is yes, then Argent's position is well taken.
Argent -further argued that i-f the Government chose
to restructure the transaction as a purchase it would incur
costs similar to those -for leasing in order to do so. In
other words, since the transaction had been arranged to
proceed as a lease, any move to restructure to a purchase
would represent an incremental cost to the purchase
alternative. In the end, a purchase would cost the
government the same as i-f stayed with the lease. While that
may be true, that explanation still sidesteps the real
issue—leasing does require higher transaction costs than
does an outright purchase.
4. Nature o-f Lease Equity Market
One o-f the -fundamental differences between the JCT
and Argent studies was their perception o-f the size o-f the
economic community which is willing and able to take
80
advantage o-f tax shelter opportunities such as TAKX. JCT
summarized the two positions in the -Following manner:
"Two consultant's reports commissioned by the Navy
contend that none o-f the tax benefits generated by a
TAKX arrangement should be counted as a governmental
cost o-f leasing. ... The argument -for not counting the
tax benefits assumes that private parties would -find
an alternative means o-f sheltering their income -from
tax i-f the TAKX opportunity were not available... The
realistic response, on the contrary, is -for investors
to add the TAKX arrangements to the pool o-f
pro-fitable ventures to be undertaken. This increases
the total amount of tax benefits claimed for
investments. . . [Thus] net tax benefits to the Navy's
lessor should be counted in the government's cost of
leasing a TAKX ship." CRef. 25: p. 183
Argent pointed out the weakness to the JCT position
by noting that the number of commercial entities which
participate in transactions of the magnitude and complexity
of the TAKX deal are quite limited. While the JCT position
is appealing from a theoretical view, it ignores the basic
requirement which precipitates tax sheltering schemes in the
first place: taxable income. Institutions which participate
in transactions like TAKX do so to shelter large, but
finite, taxable incomes. Thus, while there may be several
opportunities available, institutions are limited in taking
advantage of those opportunities by the limits of the income
which they are trying to shelter in the first place.
For the government to take the view that the
existence of TAKX increases the number of tax benefits used
by the private sector is overly simplistic and ignores
financial reality. The number of available opportunities to
shelter income almost certainly exceeds the number of
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institutions which need to shelter income. The primary
consideration that determines which opportunities
institutions will undertake is their assessment o-f the risk
involved. The government position assumes that TAKX is one
o-f only a -few acceptable tax sheltering mechanisms available
to the market. Such an assumption seems to lose validity
when -firms such as General Electric and IBM Ars able to
shelter all or most o-f their income -from taxes.
The real question which does arise -from this
discussion, however, is whether the rate o-f return provided
by the TAKX transaction is overly generous in view o-f the
level o-f risk associated with the transaction. That
question will also be addressed in Chapter VI.
E. RECONCILIATION OF COST DIFFERENCES
Table 5 provides a monetary reconciliation which
summarizes the conclusions reached by the foregoing analyses
o-f the differences between the various government and Navy
cost studies. This reconciliation, calculated on a present
value basis, concludes that leasing is less expensive than
buying the TAKX ships. Note, however, that the primary
contributing factor to reaching this conclusion consists of
taxes on interest income which results from the TAKX
transaction. Unfortunately, the inclusion of tax revenues
resulting from a leasing agreement is contrary to the new
OMB/Treasury guidelines for determining the cost of a lease.
That new guidance includes tax expenditures, but does not
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NAVY TREASURY GOV ' T
ACCT ACCT COST
-178.2 -178.2
134.8 - 60.6 74.2
79.8 79.8
ons 39.5 39 . 5
.7 .7
3. 1 - 1.4 1.7
39.7 39.7
include the tax revenues generated by a government
transaction. That new guidance is discussed in the
•following section.
TABLE 5
Reconciled Cost Comparison of the
Lease Versus Purchase Alternatives










Total - 40.3 18.3 22.0
F. OMB/TREASURY GUIDANCE FOR LEASE VERSUS BUY ANALYSIS
In 1983, the 0-f-fice o-f Management and Budget was
directed by Congress in the 1984 Defense Authorization Act
to issue guidelines governing the circumstances under which
the Department o-f Defense was authorized to use lease or
charter arrangements to procure services o-f aircraft and
ships. Notably, the TAKX ships were exempted from any new
policy originating from the new guidelines.
The treatment of tax subsidies in lease versus buy
comparative cost analyses was one of the largest issues 0MB
had to address in determining leasing guidelines. One study
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prepared by the Department of Defense Program Analysis and
Evaluation (PAS<E) section noted that at least -four separate
lease analysis methods were used by various Federal
agencies. Within the Department o-F De-fense, the Navy and
the Air Force used si gni f i cantly different lease evaluation
methods. Some of the methods analyzed leases on a pre—tax
basis, while others used an after-tax approach. PA&E
specifically criticized the Navy methodology for using a
after-tax discount rate of 10 percent which understated the
cost of a lease. PA&E argued that the Government's after
tax borrowing rate was well below 10 percent and that a
lower after—tax discount rate was appropriate. CRef. 303
In October 1984, 0MB and the Department of the Treasury
issued a joint set of guidelines prescribing the procedures
to be used by the Department of Defense in determining when
a long—term lease for ships or aircraft was more
advantageous to the government than a direct purchase.
Those guidelines apply to: CRef. 31]
a. Any leases that involve the use of an aircraft or
naval vessel built for the express purpose of being
leased to a Defense Department component; and
b. Any other long—term lease, or lease which imposes a
substantial termination liability, for an aircraft
or naval vessel valued at $1 million each at the
time of acquisition.
The OMB/Treasury guidance defined a long—term lease to
be any lease which acquired new property for a period of 3
years or more, or 5 years or more for used property. A
termination liability was considered "substantial" if its
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present value is at least one-fourth o-f the asset's current
-Fair market value, or when added to the discounted present
value o-f prior lease payments, is more than one-hal-f the
price o-f the asset.
The OMB/Treasury guidelines do not apply to short-term
leases o-f 3 years or less -for new property or less than 5
years -for used property. Also, the guidelines do not apply
to leases which acquire assets valued at less than $1
mi 1 1 i on.
1 . OMB/Treasury Leasing Policy
The OMB/Treasury guidelines speci-f i cal 1 y directed
the Department o-f Defense not to use long-term leasing as an
alternative to direct purchase unless leasing could be shown
to be less expensive than a direct purchase.
The new guidance stipulated that all 1 ease—versus—
buy cost comparisons were to be made on the basis o-f the
discounted (present-value) cost o-f the lease and the
purchase. The cost o-f leasing was to include both the cost
o-f the lease payments made by the DoD component, and the tax
subsidy provided by any special tax benefits claimed by the
lessor as a result o-f the lease. The guidance considered
the Investment Tax Credit and accelerated depreciation
deductions to be "special" benefits. CRe-f. 311
Finally, the guidance directed the Department o-f
Defense to avoid leases which deferred payment past the time
that services would be rendered by the asset. It further
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directed DoD to structure leases with equal annual payments
or payments that decreased over time, and to avoid leases
which provided -for larger lease payments in later years.
2. QMB/Treasury Lease Analysis Methodology
The new guidance directed that Department o-f De-fense
lease analysis be conducted on a pre—tax basis, since
government expenditures are measured as the direct outlay
cost with no consideration -for the taxes which may be
collected -from that outlay. The guidance -further directed
that lease costs be expressed in current, as opposed to,
constant dollars. Lease costs were considered to consist o-f
the direct lease payments plus the cost o-f the tax bene-fits
claimed by the lessor.
The cost o-f the tax subsidy is not, however, the
simple summation o-f the tax bene-fits claimed by the lessor.
The cost o-f the subsidy provided by accelerated depreciation
deductions is not the entire ACRS deduction, but rather the
present value o-f the excess o-f the accelerated depreciation
deduction allowance aver the depreciation deductions that
would have been available i -f the economic depreciation were
used -for tax purposes. Theoretically, the economic
depreciation represents the actual economic decline in the
asset's value over time. For the puroses o-f the
OMB/Treasury guidance, economic depreciation is determined
using the IRS Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) schedule. Since
.tax bene-fits are not generally taxed, the OMB/Treasury
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guidance requires the tax subsidies be converted to pre—tax
outlay equivalents. These equivalents are determined by
dividing the cost o-f the tax subsidy by one minus the
current highest corporate tax rate (1 - T) , where T is the
tax rate.
For example, i-F the ITC associated with a lease was
$10 million, the current equivalent pre-tax outlay would be:
$10 million / (1 - .46) = $18.5 million
where the current highest corporate tax rate is 46 percent.
The discount rate to be used in computing the
present value o-f the cost o-f a lease is the interest rate on
new Treasury securities whose maturity most closely
corresponds with the term o-f the lease, increased by
one—eighth o-f a percent. The additional amount represents
the current borrowing -fee charged government agencies by the
Treasury.
The new OMB/Treasury guidance directs the Department
o-f Defense to use the -following computational -formula in
determining the present value cost o-f a lease. The present
value cost o-f the lease, is compared with the purchase price
o-f the asset to determine whether the lease alternative is
less expensive than a direct purchase. I-f the lease term is
less than the useful li-fe o-f the asset, the cost o-f the
purchase alternative is adjusted to reflect the remaining
residual value. The adjusted cost o-f a purchase is
determined by deducting the discounted value of the asset's
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estimated market resale value less disposition costs -from
the purchase price. CRe-f. 313
n
P
Lease V" L^ V^
resent = Z_i + / .
Value t=l (l+r)1 t=l
h T (A t - Dt )
1-T 1 - T
(1 + r)*
where,
L t = Schedule o-f lease payments.
I. = Schedule o-f ITC available.
T = Lessor's tax rate.
r = Discount rate.
Dt = Economic depreciation.
A. = Depreciation available under the tax code.
n = Term o-f the lease.
G. SUMMARY
The purpose o-f this chapter has been to review the major
studies which analyzed the TAKX transaction in an e-ffort to
understand the di-f-ferent assumptions and methodologies which
led to entirely di-f-ferent conclusions about the cost o-f
leasing the TAKX ships.
Each o-f the studies used a present value approach to
compare the costs o-f leasing with those o-f buying a ship.
Such a method was necessary to equate di-f-ferent cash -flows
arising -from the two alternatives. One o-f the significant
differences between the Navy's primary cost study and those
o-f two Congressi onal 1 y sponsored cost studies was the
treatment o-f the taxes associated with the transaction. The
Navy study, conducted by its leasing agent Argent Group,
Ltd. , included both the tax expenditures and tax revenues
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resulting -from the TAKX transaction. The Congressional
studies conducted by the JCT and GAO included the costs o-f
tax expenditures, but considered it inappropriate to include
tax revenues resulting -from the transaction. That single
di-f-ference accounts -for the majority o-f the disparity
between the conclusions reached in the studies.
In October 1984, the Office o-f Management and Budget and
the Department o-f the Treasury promulgated a lease analysis
methodology which speci -f i cal 1 y addressed the issue o-f what
tax elements were to be included as costs o-f a lease. That
methodology adopted a be-fore—tax approach which avoids any
measure o-f tax revenues resulting -from government
expenditures. That methodology is di-f-ferent -from those used
by the various agencies which compared the costs o-f leasing
and purchasing the TAKX ships. Unfortunately for the Navy,
the new methodology is much more onerous than the
methodologies it used in making its 1 ease—versus-purchase
cost comparisons. Significantly, it only considers the tax
expenditures resulting from a tax—oriented lease transaction
and none of the tax revenues. The ramifications of this new
guidance will be addressed in Chapter VI.
89
V. SHIP FINANCING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
U. S. maritime objectives can be broadly described as
providing the ocean shipping capability needed -for national
defense, development o-f international commerce and
protection o-f American economic interests -from
noncompetitive market influences. The development and
maintenance o-f an internationally competitive American
merchant marine has been a 1 ong—standi ng goal in achieving
those objectives.
U. S. maritime policy has developed aver a long period
o-f time. The -first legislative measures passed in support
o-f American maritime interests were made in 1789. The
Shipping Act of 1916 and the Merchant Marine Act o-f 1936
-firmly established the Federal interest in insuring a strong
and competitive American maritime industry. The Merchant
Marine Act o-f 1970 reaffirmed that support and recognized
the crucial role which the U. S. Merchant Marine played in
the economic growth and security of the country. CRef . 323
In recognition of the vital role which their merchant
shipping fleets play in furthering national economic and
defense interests, governments provide substantial direct
and indirect assistance to those fleets. Ocean
transportation is a capital intensive industry. The cost of
a ship is normally well beyond the means of shipping
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companies. They are, there-fore, -forced to obtain -financing
through third parties such as banks or other large
institutional investors.
Long-term borrowing is a common method o-f -financing
acquisition o-f a ship. Long-term debt is usually -financed
in one o-f two ways: (1) borrowing directly -from major
-financial institutions; or (2) selling marketable securities
in the -form o-f bonds. Un-f ortunatel y , American shipping
securities are not usually highly regarded and must,
there-fore, provide a premium rate o-f return to investors.
One -form of Federal assistance to the U.S. maritime industry
has been to develop programs which provide -financing that
permit U.S. companies to compete in the international
market. Another means by which ocean shipping companies
acquire ships is through leasing. Leasing is accomplished
through the use o-f charter agreements which can be drawn -for
both long-term and short—term needs. CRe-f. 33: pp. 93-98]
The purpose o-f this chapter is to review the various
-financing methods available to U.S. shipping -firms in
acquiring the use o-f shipping assets. This review will then
provide a basis -from which to compare the Navy's acquisition
o-f the TAKX ships with existing industry practices.
A. PRIVATE FINANCING
Ocean transportation is a capital intensive industry.
Ships are big ticket items which constitute the largest part
o-f a shipping company's -fixed assets. Money to acquire
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ships is provided by various classes o-f owners and
creditors. Some shipping companies look to commercial banks
as their principal source o-f -Financing ships. The amount
loaned by a bank is normally determined as a percentage o-f
the ship's cost. Banks normally limit their loans -for
acquisition o-f ships to 50 to SO percent o-f the total cost
o-f the ship being acquired. The terms usually associated
with such loans srs in the range o-f -five to eight years.
Commercial banks normally charge three types o-f -financing
costs: (1) interest and spread, (2) a management -fee, and
<3) a commitment -fee. While interest rates vary between
nations, in the United States the prime interest rate is
used as the base rate -for a ship loan. Commercial banks
generally charge two percent above the current prime rate,
but if a shipping company's credit is considered low the
bank will -frequently charge an additional percent to
compensate -for the greater risk. A management -fee o-f less
than one percent is charged to cover the cost o-f processing
and administering the loan. Finally, a commitment -fee o-f
about one percent is charged to cover the period when bank
-funds Are committed to the loan, but not yet drawing
interest. To secure the loan, banks normally demand one or
more o-f the -following kinds o-f collateral: CRe-f. 33: p. 97D
One, a First Mortgage on the ship in the -form o-f a
maritime lien. The maritime lien creates an interest in the
ship which is recognized in all admiralty courts and follows
92
the ship wherever it sails. It cannot be extinguished by a
change o-f title or possession, or by the death or insolvency
o-f the shipowner.
Two, a Second Mortgage on another ship(s) in which the
borrower has a substantial unencumbered equity interest.
Three, the Assignment o-f Charter Hire which the
shipowner expects to receive -from chartering (leasing) the
vessel. This collateral assures the bank that charter hire
revenue goes -for debt service.
Four, the Guarantee -from the shipping company's parent
or a-f-filiate that it will stand behind the debt.
Five, the Assignment o-f Insurance to protect the bank in
case o-f catastrophic loss o-f the secured ship.
As a general rule, shipping companies ars able to
acquire bank financing with terms that generally range -from
-five to eight years. Ships, however, ar& long—term assets
which generally have economic lives o-f 20 to 25 years.
CRe-f. 33: p. 1623 Shipping companies expect to recover
their investment in the ship and make an acceptable pro-fit
through the sales o-f its transportation services over that
long-term period. As a result, the -five to eight year terms
which commercial banks o-f-fer are o-ften too stringent -for
some shipping companies. These companies have two
alternatives: (1) use some -form o-f equity -financing, or (2)
seek -federal assistance.
Equity -financing has the advantage of -freeing the
shipping company -from o-ften strenuous debt service
obligations, which is especially important during periods o-f
slack demand. On the other hand, the magnitude o-f a ship's
cost would require a substantial equity o-f-fering which will
dilute earnings -from existing operations and could later
threaten the owner's control. In addition, the volatility
o-f maritime earnings make the equity securities o-f shipping
companies di-f-ficult to sell in the quantity needed to
•finance ship acquisitions. CRe-f. 33: p. 106]
B. FEDERAL MARITIME SUPPORT
Ocean shipping companies which cannot or choose not to
raise capital through commercial bank loans or equity
-financing can make use o-f various -federal programs to help
them arrange financing to purchase ships. Some take the -form
o-f subsidies, while others Are simply guarantees which
enable private concerns to take advantage o-f the
government's superior credit. This paper will discuss only
three of these many programs. They are: (1) the
Construction-Differential Subsidy Program, (2) the Federal
Ship Financing Program (Title XI) , and (3) the Capital
Construction Fund Program.
1 . Construct i on—Pi f f erenti al Sub si dy
The Construction-Differential Subsidy (CDS) program
was established by the amended Merchant Marine Act of 1970
to provide Federal construction subsidies to U. S.
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shipbuilders. The size of the CDS is determined by either
negotitated contracts or the di-f-Ference between U. S.
competitive bids and the lowest cost -foreign bid -for an
equivalent vessel. The CDS is designed to place the
construction costs o-f ships built in the United States on a
parity with -foreign construction costs. The subsidy is
intended to -foster growth and maintenance o-f both the U. S.
merchant marine and the U. S. shipbuilding industry.
Eligibility requirements to quali-fy for the CDS
include: (1) the prospective purchaser must be a U. S.
citizen, (2) the ship must be built in a U. S. shipyard, and
(3) the ship must be used in the -foreign commerce o-f the
United States. CRe-f. 343
The Constructi on—Di -f -f erenti al Subsidy program is
presently unfunded and is unavailable -for use by the
shipping industry.
2. Federal Ship Financing Program (Title XI)
The Federal Ship Financing Program provides -for the
-full -faith and credit guarantee o-f the U. S. Government -for
the debt obligations (normally bonds) issued by U. S.
shipowners -for the purpose o-f financing U. S. -flag vessels.
Title XI guarantees the prompt payment in -full o-f the
interest and the unpaid principal on those debt obligations.
That guarantee enables shipowners to obtain a AAA credit
rating when issuing Title XI guaranteed debt offerings.
That rating, which is usually not available to shipowners,
provides: (1) a lower interest rate than might otherwise be
obtainable; (2) a longer term o-f -financing; (3) more
advantageous -financial covenants; and (4) no requirement o-f
personal guarantees by the owners o-f the ship. CRe-f. 353
The amount guaranteed by the government is based on
the actual cost o-f the vessel. Title XI guarantees up to 75
percent o-f the vessel 's capitalized cost i -f it is built
using Construction—Di -f-ferenti al Subsidy -funds, and up to
S7.5 percent o-f the capitalized cost if CDS is not involved.
The Maritime Administration, as administrator o-f the
guarantee program, charges an annual -fee o-f 1/8 percent to
one percent depending on the credit rating o-f the company
involved. Bonds guaranteed by the government under Title XI
can have a term o-f up to 25 years. Title XI bonds can also
be used as the long—term debt in a leveraged lease, which
enables the lenders to rely upon the government guarantee in
assessing the risk o-f the transaction. Normally, that
guarantee permits the equity participants to obtain the most
attractive -financing rates available and a longer term. See
Figure 4. LRe-f. 163
3. Capital Construction Fund
The 1970 amendment to Section 607 o-f the Merchant
Marine Act o-f 1936 authorized the Capital Construction Fund
(CCF) program. The CCF was created to assist owners and
operators o-f U.S. -f 1 ag—vessel s in accumulating the large














1. An owner trust is established by the equity participants for
the purpose of entering into a ship lease; trust certificates
are issued; a lease agreement is entered into between the
owner trustee and the lessee chartering party.
2. The owner trustee enters into a mortgage agreement
granting MARAD a first mortgage on the ship; MARAD, in
turn, issues its guarantee for the bonds.
3. The owner trustee issues bonds to the lenders who pay the
proceeds from the bonds to the indenture trustee. In the
meantime, the equity participants pay in their equity
funds to the indenture trustee.
4. The purchase pnce is paid by the indenture trustee to the
shipyard. The shipyard passes title to the owner trustee,
subject to the mortgage.
5. The lease commences and the lessee chartering party pays
rents to the indenture trustee.
6. The indenture trustee services the debt.
7. Funds not needed for debt service are distributed to the
owner trustee and eventually to the equity participants.
Figure 4
Leveraged Lease Using MARAD Guaranteed Debt
CRe-f. 16:
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program uses the de-ferment of Federal income taxes on
deposits o-f money or other property placed into the -fund to
enable shipowners or operators to build or acquire U.S.
built ships. The CCF program o-f tax deferrals was designed
to counterbalance the competitive disadvantage o-f American
-flag operators relative to -foreign -flag operators whose
vessels Are registered in countries that do not tax shipping
income. [Re-f. 363
Through the mechanism o-f tax de-ferment on deposits
in the CCF, the -fundholder can rapidly accumulate a pre-tax
-fund -for the acquisition o-f ships built in American
shipyards and -for repayment o-f mortgages on such qualified
ships. By the investment o-f assets in the -fund, a shipping
company can compound the -fund benefits and develop an even
greater pool of tax deferral funds. However, the investment
of the fund in securities and stocks is subject to certain
restrictions which are intended to preserve the integrity of
the fund. The restrictions stipulate that the money in the
fund program may be invested only in certain low—risk
securities such a U.S. government obligations, and that fund
assets may not be invested in the securities of an
affiliated company. CRef. 33: pp. 42-433
To qualify for the program, the applicant must be a
citizen of the United States and own or lease one or more
eligible vessels. Additionally, the applicant must
demonstrate to the Maritime Administration that it has the
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financial capabilities to accomplish the proposed
acquisition program. While the CCF program is intended to
encourage the acquisition o-f new vessels, it specifically
excludes proposals intended to acquire existing vessels or
to provide payment of the principal on existing
indebtedness. CRef . 36H
The Capital Construction Fund recognizes two classes
o-f vessels -for the purposes o-f the -fund. Eligible vessels
are ships which will produce income which may be deposited
into the Fund. Qualified vessels are ships which are built
or otherwise acquired with the aid of qualified withdrawals
from the CCF. To qualify for the purposes of the CCF
program, both classes of ship must be constructed in the
United States, be documented under U.S. law, and be operated
in the foreign or noncontiguous domestic trade of the United
States. CRef. 36]
The CCF account is not a joint account between the
fundholder and the Maritime Administration. Rather, it is
an individual account established by the fundholder in a
bank of its choice and maintained like any other checking or
savings account. Deposits are subject to minimum and
maximum limits which are stipulated in the CCF agreement.
Minimum limits are set to insure that sufficient funds are
deposited to accomplish the agreement's objectives. Maximum
limits are set to control the scope of the resulting tax
deferments. The maximum permissible deposit for any one
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taxable year must not exceed the sum of the -following:
CRe-f. 36:
a. Taxable income -from the operations o-f eligible ships.
b. Annual depreciation on eligible ships.
c. Net proceeds -from the sale, disposition or insurance
indemnity o-f eligible ships.
d. Earnings -from the investment or reinvestment o-f
amounts on deposit in the -fund.
The deposit o-f depreciation charges has no e-f-fect on the
operator's tax liability, since these charges Are -fully-
deductible -from the operator's net income -for income tax
purposes. Accordingly, they are known as tax-paid deposits.
Deposits o-f taxable earnings and capital gains, on the other
hand, reduce the operator's immediate tax liability.
Accordingly, they Are called tax—de-f erred deposits because
tax on them has only been postponed.
Deposits Are made into one o-f three di-f-ferent
accounts depending upon the manner in which the -funds would
have been taxed i -f not deposited. The three accounts
recognize the different deferred tax liability on the money
deposited into the fund. Tnat difference is important when
withdrawals Are made in the -future and effect the
depreciable basis of the vessel acquired using CCF funds.
The three accounts Arez
a. Ordinary Income Account
b. Capital Gain Account
c. Capital Account
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Deposits into the Ordinary Income Account are made
-from otherwise taxable income o-f the fundholder. This
permits the -fundhol der to reduce his total taxable income by
the amount deposited into the -fund. Interest and other
ordinary income earned on assets held in the -fund are also
deposited without tax liability into this account.
Deposits into the Capital Gain Account represent
amounts which would otherwise be taxed at the capital gains
rate. The CCF permits the -fundhol der to de-fer those taxes
until they are withdrawn at a later date.
Deposits into the Capital Account represent amounts,
such as depreciation, that would not be taxed. While there
is no immediate tax bene-fit, it allows the -fundholder to
invest these amounts and de-fer the tax on the earnings or
gain -from those investments since all earnings and gains
-from -fund assets must be deposited back into the -fund.
CRe-f. 36:
Appendix A provides a general example o-f how the CCF
can be used to help -finance the purchase o-f a new ship.
Withdrawals -from the CCF are divided into quali-fied
and nonqualified -for tax purposes. In general, quali-fied
withdrawals receive tax preference treatment. Nonqualified
withdrawals generally incur tax liability in the year of
withdrawal
.
To be classified as a qualified withdrawal from the
fund, it must satisfy the fallowing requirements: LRef. 363
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a. The withdrawal must comply with the terms of the
agreement between the shipping company and the
Maritime Administration.
b. The withdrawal must be used to acquire, construct or
reconstruct a qualified ship.
c. The withdrawal must be used -for the payment o-f debt
service incurred in connection with the acquisition o-f
the qualified ship.
I-f the money is withdrawn -from the capital gain
account -for the acquisition o-f a qualified ship and its
complement, the cost basis of the operational assets for tax
purposes is reduced by an amount equal to 62.5 percent of
the withdrawal in the case of a corporation. For taxpayers
other than corporations, there is a 50 percent reduction in
the basis. The portion of the qualified withdrawal which
comes from the ordinary income account and goes toward the
acquisition of a qualified ship reduces the basis of the
operational assets by a like amount. That is, the cost
basis of the operational assets is reduced dollar for
dollar. Thus, when the qualified withdrawal is made, taxes
are not payable through the reduced depreciation deduction
during the economic life of the ship.
All withdrawals which do not meet the requirements
of a qualified withdrawal are termed as nonqualified
withdrawals. Although these nonqualified withdrawals may or
may not result in taxable income, there are no penalty
provisions relating to nonqualified withdrawals. These
nonqualified withdrawals are considered to have been made
10:
from the three accounts o-f the capital construction -fund in
the -following order: CRe-f. 36 1
a. Ordinary Income Account. The shipping company
includes this portion o-f the account in taxable income
in the year the withdrawal is made.
b. Capital gain account. The shipping company includes
this amount in taxable income in the year of
withdrawal. It is reported as an itme o-f long-term
capital gain gain recognized during the year in which
the withdrawal is made.
c. Capital account. When money is withdrawn in excess o-f
the ordinary income account and the capital gain
account, it must be made -from the capital account. It
is tax -free.
C. SHIP LEASING (CHARTERING)
Chartering is the maritime equivalent to leasing. As
discussed in Chapter Two, chartering ships is attractive to
ship operators because it permits lower period payments than
a purchase alternative. The chartering company can o-f-fer
such lower rates because it uses the cash -flows created by
the tax bene-fits o-f ownership and pass them back to the
charterer in the -form o-f lower charter rates. Chartering
takes one o-f two basic -forms: a time charter or a bareboat
charter. Each is unique in important ways.
Time charter is the leasing o-f a ship by a shipowner to
a Charterer -for a stated period o-f time at a stipulated
rate. The shipowner provides wages, repairs and consumable
stores and the charterer is responsible -for the payment o-f
-fuel, cargo handling and port charges. Time charters may be
short-term or long-term leases depending on the charter
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party terms. Bath time charters are qualified and accounted
for as operating leases becuase the shipowner retains all
the normal risks o-f ownership and the charterer gains no
special property interests other than certain usage rights.
The Bareboat Charter also involves the lease of a ship
to a charterer -for a certain period o-f time at a stipulated
rate. The charterer pays all operating expenses o-f the
ship, including wages, fuel, repairs, consumable stores,
cargo handling and port charges. The charterer obtains
complete control of the ship which he is operating as if the
ship belonged to him. Bareboat charters are often for
long—term periods with charter hire payments due on a "hell
or high water" basis. Noncancel able long—term bareboat
charters qualify as capital or financing leases.
1 . Advantages to Charter ;
a. Financing
The charterer has complete financing potential
through the charter hire. No down payment is necessary from
the charterer since the shipowner finances the total
purchase price. Because lease terms can be structured for
much of the useful life of the asset, the charter often
provides long-term financing not normally available.
b. Fl ex i bi 1 i ty
The charterer is able to charter a ship for the
specific time period necessary to meet his requirements and
is not saddled with ownership problems. The charterer can
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structure the charter term to meet his shipping needs and
not have to make arrangements -for -full utilization o-f a ship
over its use-ful li-fe. CRe-f. 33: p. 1233
c. Level Payments
Charter payments permit matching expense to
revenue produced -from operation o-f the vessel. In addition,
the -fixed nature o-f charter payments enables the charterer
to know the exact amount o-f -future -financing costs and to
predict more accurately -future cash needs. The -fixed nature
o-f the payments also enable the charterer to take advantage
o-f -future in-flat ion much like a purchase.
2. Pi sadvantages :
a. Control
The charterer has no control over the chartered
vessel at the conclusion o-f the charter term. Also during
the term o-f the charter, the charterer is restricted in his
potential usage o-f the chartered vessel.
b. Hell or High Water Payments
The charter-hire rental payment is a -fixed
charge which the charterer must meet when due regardless o-f
the chartered ship's activity. Should the charterer miss his
payment, he is liable not only -for the missed payment but
also -for any losses the shipowner would suffer -for the
remaining term o-f the charter. CRe-f. 33: pp. 123-1243
io:
c. Loss o-f Residual
The lessee or charterer retains no monetary
interest in the value o-f the asset at the end o-f the charter
term despite any remaining li-fe or use-fulness le-ft in the
asset.
d. Cost o-f Early Termination
The terms o-f a charter, like a lease, are set at
a rate which will enable the owner/lessor to recover its
investment and earn an acceptable return over the length o-f
the charter. To protect the lessor incase that charter
period is abridged by the charterer, a termination penalty
is stipulated. The cost o-f terminating a charter early is
set at an amount su-f-ficient to enable the lessor to recover
its investment and earn the desired rate o-f return.
CRe-f. 16]
e. Indemnities and Other Complexities
The use o-f ship leases is often predicated upon
the use o-f tax bene-f its to subsidize the transaction. The
charterer is usually required to indemnify the lessor
against the loss o-f those tax bene-fits in order to entice
the lessor into the transaction. The documentation, number
o-f parties involves, and complexity in providing that
indemnity assurance result in time consuming and expensive
transaction costs. CRe-f. 17: pp. 1260-12613
The use o-f leveraged leases in conjunction with
government support programs such as Title XI and the Capital
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Construction Fund ce.n result in particularly attractive
-financing costs -for ship charters. Title XI debt guarantees
permit access to the lowest cost capital available which
lowers the annual debt service requirements for all parties.
The CCF permits the equity participants to shelter income at
particularly advantageous rates, not normally available to
other -financing arrangements.
D. CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION FUND AND LEVERAGED LEASING
Since leveraged leasing has become such a popular means
o-f -financing the construction of new commercial ships, the
CCF program has adapted to accomodate its special structure.
Normally in order to use a CCF, the -fundholder had to be the
owner o-f the vessel. In a leveraged lease arrangement, as
we saw earlier, title to the vessel is actually held by an
owner trustee. The CCF program has been adapted, however,
to recognize that the equity participants, although not
actually holding title, have significant ownership interest
in the vessel and are therefore entitled to enter into a CCF
agreement
.
By the very nature of the leveraged lease, there is
likely to be no taxable income generated for the equity-
participants in the early years due to the excess of
allowable income tax deductions over income. The primary
source of early deposits into the fund, therefore comes from
the deposit of funds equal to the depreciation taken. The
early deposit of the maximum allowed owing to depreciation
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is important -for a CCF participant, because it permits the
greatest amount of tax deferral interest income to be
accumulated. The combination o-f the depreciation deposits
and the tax deferred interest income on those deposits, i -f
made early enough, are o-f ten sufficient to fund the entire
debt service requirements over the entire term of the
mortgage. CR'ef . 37U
1 . Si ngl e—Vessel Agreements
The CCF agreements held by equity participants in
leveraged lease arrangments are informally called "Single
Vessel Arrangements". Normally the Maritime Administration
will not enter into a CCF agreement to acquire an existing
vessel, however, it recognizes that in leveraged leases the
equity participants are not usually determined until the new
vessel is about to be delivered. Consequently, an equity
participant is allowed to enter into a CCF agreement with
the objective of making withdrawals from the fund for its
pro rata share of the principal payments on the
indebtedness, if the Maritime Administration is notified
prior to fixing the financing terms of the leveraged lease.
The deposits into the fund for single vessel agreements come
from the equity participant's share of depreciation of the
vessel and income from the lease. LRef . 361
Each equity participant may establish a fund with
the same ship being both the eligible and qualified
agreement vessel. That is, the equity participant is
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permitted to use the vessel purchased under the leveraged
lease as the eligible vessel -from which the -funds come -for
deposit into the CCF. That same vessel is also considered
to be the qualified vessel for which the equity participant
can use those CCF funds to purchase the vessel. The lessee
may also identify the ship as an eligible agreement vessel
in its own CCF. CRef. ZS1
The single-vessel agreement permits a leveraged
lease equity participant to set up a CCF account using funds
generated by the ship that was purchased. For the equity
participant, those funds normally consist of the
depreciation taken on the vessel. Periodic deposits in the
amount of permissible depreciation are placed into the
Capital Account where they earn interest. Deposits are made
until a balance is attained which can provide for annual
withdrawals for the required debt service over the remaining
life of the debt instrument. Those withdrawals will reduce
the principal in the Capital Account to zero by the end of
that term. In effect, the equity participant is able to set
up a self — 1 i qui dati ng fund to purchase the agreement ship
using the depreciation on that same ship. Appendix B
provides an example of how the si ngl e—vessel agreement can
be used.
2. Capital Construction Fund Benefits Model
The Maritime Administration attempted to develop a
CCF Benefits Model for the purpose of analyzing the
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financial benefits associated with participation in the
Capital Construction Fund program. The CCF Bene-fits Model
should have calculated three values the sum of which
determined the total Fund bene-fit to -fundhol ders. Those
values consisted o-f: (1) interest which accrues on the
de-ferred tax dollars deposited in the -fund; (2) interest
which the -fundholder does not incur because an interest -free
loan o-f its de-ferred tax dollars is available in lieu o-f a
commercial loan, and; (3) evaluate the effect o-f possible
partial loss o-f the Investment Tax Credit which may reduce
the absolute bene-fits received from the CCF.
The model was to have used data -furnished by the
users regarding the size o-f their deposits into the -fund o-f
ordinary income from vessel earnings, net proceeds from
vessel sales and depreciation or other capital deposits.
Withdrawal information was also used including such items as
the cost of the vessel to be paid for using CCF funds, the
method of financing, the depreciation method and the
residual value. Other information included assumed Federal
tax rates, fund investment rate of return, interest rates on
borrowed funds and a discount rate.
The model was intended to provide a listing of
expected cash flows and fund balances such as the balance of
aftertax amounts in the ordinary income, capital gain and
capital accounts by period, and the balance of tax deferred
amounts in the ordinary income and capital gain accounts by
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period, and provide a summary o-f the total amount o-f tax
bene-fits taken by f undhol ders. In addition, it was to have
produced the interest earned bene-fit on de-ferred tax
dollars, the depreciation available on the acquired asset
with and without CCF considerations, the tax a-f-fect o-f
changes in depreciation, the balance o-f de-ferred tax dollars
being utilized by the -fundholder and the resulting interest
savings accruing to the -fundholders on the interest -free
loan o-f de-ferred tax -funds. Finally, it was to have shown
the ITC computed with and without CCF consideration, and sum
all bene-fits received on a by—period basis, a cumulative
basis and on a discounted present value basis. CRe-f. 3SD
Un-f ortunatel y , the e-f-fort to develop this model
proved more complex than originally thought. In an attempt
to make the model general enough -for use by the diverse
makeup o-f possible CCF participants, the model became to
large and complex to be o-f much bene-fit. The Maritime
Administration has abandoned -further development o-f the
model -for the time being and instead relies on the
computations developed by potential CCF participants.
E. SHIP LEASING UNDER THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981
As discussed in Chapter Two, the passage o-f ERTA
repealed many o-f the requirements necessary to quali-fy as a
true lease in the eyes o-f the IRS. ERTA greatly enhanced
the transferability o-f investment tax credits and tax
depreciation deductions between taxable entities. Under
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ERTA, the parties to a lease no longer had to ensure a
non-tax related pro-fit as the basis -for the transaction.
ERTA also provided a ninety-day window which permitted -firms
which had placed equipment into service in 1981, prior to
ERTA ' s passage, to enter into tax benefit leases. Among the
various lease -forms which emerged as the result o-f ERTA, the
sale and leaseback transaction became very popular.
The Sal e—Leaseback is a transaction in which the lessor
buys a vessel -from a charterer and simultaneously bareboat
charters it back the charterer. The nominal sales price o-f
the vessel is set at its present value, but the only
outright payment made by the buyer to the charterer is -for
the value o-f the tax benefits realized by the lessor as a
result o-f the transaction. The lessor signs a non-recourse
note assuming the outstanding debt on the vessel is payable
aver the same term as the charter. The charterer agrees to
pay the lessor charter payments which exactly o-f-fset the
debt service on the loan. The net effect of this
transaction is that the charterer has reduced its
acquisition cost of the vessel by the amount it receives
from the lessor for the tax benefits it gives up. The
lessor earns a return on the money it would have otherwise
paid in taxes. CRef. 17j pp . 1268-1269H
As the Federal government came to realize the magnitude
of its tax revenue loss as the result of the "safe-harbor"
leases permitted under ERTA, it moved to curtail many of
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ERTA ' s provisions. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility-
Act (TEFRA) greatly restricted the use " sa-fe-harbor " leases
and essentially reinstituted pre-ERTA leasing requirements.
F. SUMMARY
The ocean shipping industry is particularly capital
intensive. Few, i -f any, shipping companies are able to
finance the acquisition o-f new ships directly -from internal
sources. Private shipping companies are largely dependent
upon banks and other large -financial investment institutions
to provide the capital necessary to acquire their ships. The
United States government, recognizing the strategic
importance o-f a strong national maritime capability, has
developed several programs to -financially assist private
U.S. shipping companies. Three o-f the most important
-federal maritime assistance programs were described.
Chapter V has been presented to provide the reader with
an understanding o-f the -financing practices o-f the private
sector in acquiring new ships. Such a review is necessary
to provide, in so -far as possible, a yardstick -from which to
compare the TAKX transaction with private sector practice.
Such a comparison is necessary to determine the
competitiveness o-f the TAKX terms. Those comparisons are
made in Chapter VI.
li:
VI. ANALYSIS OF TAKX LEASING ISSUES
The purpose o-f the preceding -four chapters has been to
present the reader with an understanding o-f the various
issues which have surrounded the Navy's TAKX leveraged
lease. Each chapter has dealt at some length with a
particular aspect o-f that transaction and the Federal
leasing environment in an e-f-fort to illuminate the
complexity o-f lease analysis and lease agreements. The
diversity o-f those chapters and the issues which were raised
in them, however, have painted a broad brush picture o-f the
various aspects o-f the TAKX transaction and Federal leasing
in general. This chapter will attempt to place the major
issues in proper perspective.
This chapter will review and analyze -further the major
issues which have been identi-fied in previous chapters -from
two vantage points. First, the TAKX transaction provides an
opportunity to look critically at government lease versus
buy cost comparison methodologies and guidelines. Second,
TAKX enables us to compare the government's methods and
costs o-f leasing with those -found in the private sector when
leasing similar assets.
A. GOVERNMENT LEASE-VERSUS-BUY ANALYSIS
Prior to the TAKX transaction, no -formal guidelines
existed -for government 1 ease-ver sus-buy cost comparisons.
114
The General Accounting O-f-fice noted the impact o-f the lack
o-f such guidelines in its report to Congress on De-fense
Department leasing:
"Evaluation o-f the various lease versus purchase
analyses showed a lack o-f prescribed criteria on how
these analyses should be performed or what -factors
should be included or excluded. Consequently, there
can be vast differences in the results o-f such
analyses even -for the same program." CRe-f. 15: p. 8H
The major inconsistencies alluded to by GAD included the
f ol lowing:
1 . Di-f-fering Methods o-f Analysis
No -formal guidance existed to prescribe the criteria
-for performing a 1 ease—versus-purchase analysis. Each of
the major studies which analyzed the TAKX transaction used a
different net present value model. Not suprisingly, each o-f
those studies arrived at different conclusions about the
feasibility of the lease option. In developing its own
lease analysis program, OSD ' s Program Analysis and
Evaluation division found four different lease analysis
programs within the government itself.
The basic issue of which costs, agency cost or total
government cost, should be used to evaluate potential lease
projects was not specified in existing guidelines. No
common consensus existed over whether a pre—tax or an
after-tax method should be used in evaluating the cash flows
of a lease. There was no agreement on the discount rate to
be used when determining the net present value of long-term
leasing costs. Further disagreement existed o\/er the
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treatment o-f residual values and whether to use current or
constant dollars in lease versus purchase analysis.
In an attempt to come to grips with these problems,
especially where Defense Department leasing was involved,
Congress directed OMB to provide a speci-fic set o-F
guidelines -for evaluating -future lease or charter programs.
As discussed in Chapter Four, those guidelines require,
among other things:
a. The cost o-f leasing must include both the current
dollar cost o-f lease payments and the cost o-f tax
benefits claimed by the lessor.
b. The cost o-f the tax subsidy resulting -from the
lessor's use o-f tax benefits must be converted into a
pre—tax equivalent.
c. The discount to be used in computing the present value
of a lease is the interest rate on new Treasury
securities whose maturity most closely corresponds
with the term of the lease, increased by, one—eighth
of a percent.
While the new OMB guidance resolves the issue of
ambiguity in lease versus purchase analysis, it effectively
closes the door on long—term leasing by the Department of
Defense. Such automatic closure is open to criticism on two
poi nts.
First, the OMB guidance assumes that all lease
versus buy analyses should be conducted on a "cost to the
government" basis. In other words, OMB now requires
government agencies to include the cost of tax subsidies as
part of the total cost of a lease. Is that proper? The
answer to that question depends on. what Congress' intent was
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when it passed laws permitting tax subsidies. One o-f the
major purposes o-f tax subsidies o-f the type used in the TAKX
transaction is to induce new capital -formation. I-f a
tax-exempt governmental agency undertakes a program that
increases capital -formation, then only the direct agency
cost should be considered. In effect, this view assumes
Congress intended -for the government to pay -for increased
investment by the private sector through decreased tax
revenues.
At the center o-f this issue is the government's loss
o-f tax revenues. In an era when budget deficits are
becoming increasingly burdensome, Congress is sensitive to
charges that it is not fiscally responsible. In 1981,
Congress faced the difficult task of stimulating the economy
out of a recession while checking its own spending. By
legislating the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Congress
chose to trade increased tax benefits for increased capital
growth. The explosive growth in the use of those subsidies
by local, state, and Federal agencies, however, was an
unforeseen consequence of that initiative. Forbes magazine
estimated that leasing by tax-exempt entities tripled
between 1980 and 1982 to an estimated $2 billion. CRef. 393
Congress questioned the cost and the propriety of
government use of tax subsidy programs. Yet, the question
arises, should an individual Federal agency be expected to
assume part of the cost of those subsidies? The new
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OMB/Treasury guidelines -for Department o-f Defense lease
versus purchase analysis require such a -fiscal assumption.
From a simplistic standpoint, one can argue that
since the government must bear both the cost o-f De-fense
spending and tax subsidies which result from such spending,
that it is proper to charge those costs against the De-fense
Department. That is, a de-fense contract may lead to new
investment by a contractor, but at the expense o-f decreased
tax revenues. OMB/Treasury guidance directs those revenue
losses be added to the cost o-f the de-fense contract which
precipitated that loss. But, doesn't such a stance ignore
the basic premise -for the tax subsidies in the -first place?
Tax subsidies o-f the type used in the TAKX transaction were
the price the government was willing to pay for new capital
-formation. Does it matter who uses those subsidies as long
as the longer term goal o-f increased capital -formation is
attained?
A second consideration is whether the new OMB
guidance properly assesses the true costs o-f a long —term
lease? OMB guidance dictates the use o-f a discount rate
based on the government's cost o-f borrowing. Discount rate
determination is a subject which has received a great deal
o-f attention from the financial community over the years.
Suffice to say, the private sector has yet to reach
agreement on the best method of making such a determination,
The government's selection of a discount rate is further
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complicated by debate over whether the government's cost o-f
borrowing is the proper -figure to use as a discount rate.
Considerable support exists -for using the
opportunity cost which reflects the actual cost o-f capital
in the private sector and thereby better measures the cost
o-f real resources shifted -from private to the public sector.
Venkataraman and Stevens in their analysis o-f Federal
capital budgeting noted that use o-f the government borrowing
rate, which is lower than the opportunity cost, tends to
favor higher and more immediate government spending. In
other words, the lower discount rate favors the purchase
alternative relative to the lease alternative. The use of
the opportunity cost rate, however, favors deferring
investments by the public sector. CRef. 40H
For the TAKX program, the difference of a few
percentage points in the discount rate results in
substantial changes (literally millions of dollars) in the
net present value of the long-term lease. The effects of
the discount rate on the lease versus buy decision were
graphically displayed in Figure 3 on page 69 of this study.
2. Lease—Versus-Not Buy
Probably, the most ignored facet of the TAKX
transaction has been the failure of the critical studies to
acknowledge that the purchase alternative was not an option.
Procurement funds for Marine support ships were eliminated
from the Defense budget in fiscal year 1981. In recognition
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o-f the need -for those ships, however, Congress recommended
the Navy investigate the -feasibility o-f using the U. S.
merchant marine to provide the necessary shipping. In
response to that direction, the Navy submitted the TAKX
build and charter program in FY 1982, which was subsequently
approved by -four Congressional oversight committees.
As part o-f the justification -for that program, the
Navy provided a comprehensive lease versus purchase cost
analysis. The Navy analysis compared Navy as well as total
government costs o-f chartering as compared to an outright
purchase o-f the TAKX ships. The Navy concluded that
chartering ships -from the U.S. merchant marine was not only
-feasible, but also practical -from a -financial standpoint.
Subsequent to the review and approval by several
Congressional oversight committees, the Navy's analysis was
examined by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and the
General Accounting O-f-fice (GAO) . Both organizations issued
reports that criticized the Navy's assessment of the costs
involved in a long—term lease o-f the TAKX ships. Both JCT
and GAO reported that chartering the TAKX ships would only
be less costly to the Navy. From a total government
perspective, however, chartering would be more expensive
than an outright purchase o-f the ships.
The cornerstone o-f the criticism which has been
leveled at the TAKX leveraged lease has been that the
purchase alternative was available. Were this the case, the
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Navy would not have had any reason -for exploring the use of
leasing to -finance the acquisition o-f the TAKX ships. Are
we to assume that if the GAD and JCT studies had been
available at the outset, that Congress would have
appropriated the -funds -for a purchase? Taken to its logial
conclusion, that is the implication o-f the those studies.
While the analytical methods and assumptions used by
JCT and GAO Are judgmental, the major shortcoming o-f both
reports was their -failure to recognize or address the
1 ease—versus—not buy decision -facing the Navy. Both reports
evaluated the lease option as though the Navy had a
purchase option. Such an assumption might have been valid
i-f that analysis was intended to determine, based on cost
alone, whether the TAKX ships should be acquired in the
-first place. As noted above, however, cost was not the only
criteria. Support -for the Marines was also a primary
consideration. Without Congressional approval o-f
construction -funds, the purchase option was precluded.
As noted in Chapter II, the decision to lease or buy
is a secondary decision. The -first decision to be made in
the acquisition process is whether the assets or services
Are needed in the first place. Those needs are determined
by the organization's goals and objectives.
Once the decision is made to acquire an asset, the
question of how to finance the acquisition is addressed.
The entity has two basic choices: buy or lease. The entity
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determines the costs of both alternatives and choses the
least expensive. The decision to buy, however, assumes that
funds to finance the purchase are available. In the case of
defense procurement, appropriation funds must be authorized
by Congress. In the case of the Marine support ships, such
authorization was denied. The only remaining choices were
to charter ships needed to support the Marines, or not
support the Marines. Presumably, the Navy and Congress
chose the former alternative.
Further credence is afforded the 1 ease—versus-don '
t
buy approach when one considers the basic question: Was
Congress willing to buy the TAKX ships once its analysis
concluded that to do so would be less expensive than a
purchase? If it was not willing to do so, then the lease—
versus-purchase methodology was inappropriate for the
analysis of the TAKX transaction. The correct approach
should have been a lease—versus—dont ' t buy approach.
3. Advantages and Disadvantages of Long—Term Department
of Defense Leases
Honig and Coley in their article on lease analysis
noted one of the dangers of conventional lease analysis.
The conventional procedure in lease analysis, is to
establish a hypothetical "loan" equivalent to the lease
against which the lease itself is compared. As Honig and
Coley point out, however, the hypothetical loan is only
"equivalent" in the narrow sense that the same asset is
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acquired. The same -financing is not acquired and debt
capacity is impacted di f -ferentl y . CRef. 413
While the Navy does not have a debt capacity, per
se , it does operate within de-finite -funding constraints. I-f
the TAKX ships had been purchased, ship construction -funds
would have been required -for them. These -funds come -from
the Navy's ship construction appropriation <SCN) which are
part o-f its larger -five—year defense plan. Funds -for
construction are set within -finite limits, based upon the
Navy's and Congress' assessment o-f ship needs to carry out
-future national de-fense missions. The TAKX program was not
part o-f that plan. Acquisition o-f the thirteen TAKX ships
would have required the Navy to give up construction o-f
other, badly needed ships. Within those limits, critical
choices would have to have been made about the types and
numbers o-f ships to be procured.
Leasing, on the other hand, offered a way to procure
bath the TAKX ships and not impact the Navy's ship
construction -funds. Leasing is -funded -from the Navy's
annual Operation and Maintenance appropriation by the Navy
Industrial Fund. The long—term charter permits the Navy to
spread the cost o-f using the services o-f the ships over
their useful life rather than committing to a large up-front
obligation for their outright purchase. Thus, the Navy
faces a question not so much of acquisition, but one of cash
flows. With a purchase, the Navy obtains title to a group
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o-f ships, but at the cost o-f a large up-front cash outlay
and an immediate, commensurate reduction in the acquisition
o-f other ships. Chartering, on the other hand, obligates
the Navy to a series o-f cash payments over a 25—year period
and does not directly impact the acquisition o-f other ships.
The disadvantage to the Navy o-f using the Navy
Industrial Fund to pay the "rental" cost o-f the TAKX ships
is the loss o-f operations and maintenance funds normally
used -for -fleet support. To offset the loss of Q&M funds,
the Navy is forced to either decrease other activities or
increase its 02<M appropriation. Either alternative carries
with it an implicit opportunity cost. Any decision to
reduce current activities to provide funding for TAKX
results in the loss of some operation or maintenance
activity. A decision to solicit a higher Operations and
Maintenance appropriation may result in offsetting
reductions elsewhere in the Navy budget. Seeking such
increases also incurs some political expense in attaining
that increase.
Both Are difficult propositions. The projected
annual charter costs are about $217 million, which
constitutes about 5 percent of the discretionary portion of
the 0?<M budget (80-85 percent of the 0&M budget is
considered fixed) . In view of the impact of TAKX on the QS'.M
appropriation, it is likely the Navy will have to seek
additional 0&M funds. CRef. 18: p. 6-93
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4. Other Considerations
Present 1 ease—versus-buy analyses concentrate solely
on comparing the respective costs of acquiring a new asset.
No consideration is given to an analysis o-f the bene-fits and
savings which the government incurs as a result o-f the type
o-f acquistion. The new OMB/Treasury guidance assumes that
the price o-f an asset is always the same, regardless o-f
whether the government buys or leases through an
intermediary who buys the asset. Such an assumption is open
to criticism on two points.
First, i -f the government purchases a ship, that ship
must be built using standard government and military
specifications. Under a lease, however, commercial
specifications a.re applied during construction. Recent
Department of Defense studies have concluded that the
government's insistance upon building to required defense
specifications increase the costs of acquisition to the
government. CRef. 421
Second, the ability of the government to bring
eighteen ships on line in the same period as the TAKX build
and charter program is doubtful. As experience has shown,
most Navy shipbuilding programs are subjected to delays as
Congress attempts to reduce Defense budgets by delaying
procurement programs. The affect of such delays has been to
increase the overall cost of such programs.
1 .<i_)
Third, one could also take a philosophical view o-f
leasing as an extention o-f the Federal government's move
towards contracting -for services -from the private sector.
The Federal government has been moving towards increased
reliance upon the private sector, in such areas as public
works and -food service, as a way to reduce capital
investment and bene-fit -from the private sector's competitive
advantages.
8. PRIVATE SECTOR COMPARISON
To date, the major studies which have analyzed the TAKX
transaction have concentrated on the development o-f
analytical methodologies to be employed in conducting
government lease versus buy cost comparisons. Little, if
any, attention has been paid to analyzing the TAKX
transaction -from a private sector perspective. Such an
analysis is important -for two reasons. First, the potential
government lessee should understand what motivates the
private sector to lease its assets to the public sector.
Second, the potential government lessee should be aware o-f
the the risks and constraints which exist in the private
sector leasing market and understand how government leases
compare with the rates o-f return and financial risks in that
envi ronment
.
1 . 3QQ'/. Offering For TAKX Equity Participation
In 1983, the financial advisors for each of the TAKX
awardees solicted proposals from potential equity
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participants -for the TAK.X and T-5 programs. The
solicitation o-f those equity investments constituted a
private placement in the sense that it was restricted to
large institutional investors considered to have the ability
to make commitments -for substantial parts o-f the total TAKX
program. In response to that solicitation, one knowledgable
source reported that the Navy received a 300 percent
offering -From potential equity sources.
Given the magnitude o-f the response -for
participation in the deal, the prudent question to ask is,
why? Undoubtedly, several -factors contributed to the
attractiveness o-f the TAKX and T—5 programs. One major
-factor is that the programs were structured as leveraged
leases and, as such, o-f-fered lucrative and potentially large
tax shelters. In 1983, tax shelters were coming under heavy-
scrutiny by the Internal Revenue Service. There-fore, a
government o-f-fered tax shelter was undoubtedly quite
attractive to large financial institutions -for at least two
reasons. One, large -financial institutions in search of tax
shelters need them for very large sums of money. The
availability of tax shelters in the hundred million dollar
range is quite limited. Two, all tax shelters are
inherently risky. The largest risk is the possibility that
the IRS will not accept the tax sheltering scheme. Another
concern is the inherent risk that the transaction will not
be successful and will not generate the anticipated tax
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advantages. These and other possible reasons are discussed
in detail in the -following sections.
2. Tax Indemnities
The tax indemnities o-f the TAKX transaction have
been criticized on a number o-f points. The major source o-f
contention has been the Navy's agreement to indemnify the
equity participants in case o-f loss of the anticipated
Investment Tax Credit to insure the agreed upon rate o-f
return. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) considered
that i ndemni -f i cati on provided exceptional protection against
an un-favorable tax ruling. The JCT contention, however, has
little credibility in view o-f private sector practice in
writing lease agreements.
Leasing expert Peter Nevitt described the role o-f
leasing tax indemnities by noting that, "Lease agreements
generally provide -for an indemnity against the possible loss
by the lessor o-f the contemplated tax benefits. " And more
to the point, Nevitt added:
"From a lessor's standpoint, the lease rate
contemplates that the lessor will be able to claim
certain tax benefits, and the lease should be
adjusted upwards or a cash settlement made i -f such
tax benefits are not available. The lessor regards
its risk as a lending risk, not a speculative risk on
the availability of tax benefits..." CRef. 10: p. 55D
Proponents o-f- the TAKX transaction are also quick to
point out another aspect of the ITC indemnity. If the ITC
is ruled to be unavailable, for whatever reason, the
Treasury and not the lessor benefits. If the lessor loses
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the ITC, it adjusts the Navy's charter hire payments upward
in the amount necessary to oawer the increased tax burden.
The Treasury receives that increase in the -form o-f revenues
it would have otherwise -foregone. In e-f-fect, the Navy pays
the Treasury -for the lessor's loss o-f the ITC. Thus, the
Navy's cost o-f charter increases, but the total cost to the
government remains the same.
Schmitt and Crump in their analysis o-f this issue
noted that i -f charter agreements did not provide -for such
tax indemnities, the lessor would set charter hire rates at
a higher level to reflect the greater risk. Then, if the
tax benefits were ruled available, the lessor would collect
those benefits as well as receiving a higher charter hire
rate. The Navy and the Treasury, on the other hand, would
gain nothing from a favorable tax ruling. CRef. 43: p. 693
For the reasons described above, the tax indemnity
provisions of the TAKX transaction compare favorably with
similar transactions in the private sector.
3. Guaranteed Rate of Return
The TAKX transaction has been criticized as
providing an overly generous guaranteed rate of return in
view of the substantial risks the Navy agreed to assume.
One financial source, not connected with the transaction,
evaluated the TAKX guaranteed 11.745 percent rate of return
as that rate expected for a BAA rated long-term investment




why did the Navy agree to provide a rate o-f return
that the market would have required -for more risky
i nvestments?
Three elements appear to be responsible. First, the
structure o-f the transaction was extremely complex. As
identi-fied in Chapter Three, the basic ship leveraged lease
involves no -fewer than seven major parties. The TAKX
transaction was -further complicated by the existance o-f four
different shipowners which had contracted with the Navy to
-finance, build and operate eighteen ships. Those ships were
to be sold to a disparate group o-f lessors, who had to
obtain a substantial part o-f the purchase price -from
long—term lenders willing to back them on a non—recourse
basis in the transaction. Once the lessors acquired the
ships, they then leased them to a contractor under a
bareboat charter agreement. The contractor, in turn,
provided the Navy with ship "services" under a time charter.
Only very large -financial institutions possess the legal,
tax, and financial knowledge and expertise to comprehend and
execute such a complex transaction.
Second, to assure the tax benefits, the leases were
structured so that a contractor stood between the Navy and
the owners/lessors. This constituted a problem for
potential equity participants. The Navy represented the
source of funds upon which the owners/lessors (the equity
participants) depended to service the long-term loans they
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needed to acquire the ships. Since those loans were
non-recourse to the owners/lessors, the interest rate they
paid on those loans was determined in large part by the
lending institutions' assessment o-f the Navy's (the
charterer) ability to make charter payments. The -Full -faith
and credit o-f the Federal government theoretically stood
behind the loans. Since the charter payments -flowed through
the contractor, the owners/ 1 essors required complex
guarantees that charter hire payments be protected -from
possible de-fault by the contractor. The 1 1 . 745/1 rate o-f
return was intended to partially compensate equity
participants -for those complexities.
Third, the size o-f the transaction required the Navy
to o-f-fer an attractive rate of return. The size of the
minimum equity investment was set at the cost of one ship or
roughly $162 million for a TAKX ship. In addition, the rate
of return was to be earned over a twenty—five year period.
Such terms Ar& demanding in two respects. One, the initial
investment is large and limits the potential investors to a
few large institutions. Two, the length of the investment
is inherently risky because it assumes the equity
participant will have an income to shield during the early
years of the lease term when the tax benefits Are greatest
and that the equity participant can achieve the desired rate
of return over a relatively long 25-year period.
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This third agrument , however, is not altogether
convincing in light o-f recent large scale debt o-f-ferings in
the private sector. In 1980, IBM sold $1 billion in debt at
the Treasury bill rate. Thus, the large question looms, why
was a private company able to negotiate better debt terms
than the Federal government which enjoys the superior credit
rating? The answer would appear to lay in the greater
complexity o-f the TAKX transaction.
The treasurer o-f a prominent shipping company which
had been asked to participate in the TAKX transaction
remarked, when asked to assess the Navy's rate o-f return
guarantee, that in view o-f the complexity and the size o-f
the transaction, 11.745/1 was a reasonable rate o-f return to
offer.
Some observers consider the TAKX transaction to be a
risk -free venture -for the equity participants. As we have
seen above, the government's guarantee o-f a steady -flow o-f
charter hire payments is only one part o-f the transaction
considered by potential investors. Other major
considerations include the size and complexity o-f the
transaction, and the investor's perception o-f its ability to
achieve the rate o-f return possible over the li-fe o-f the
investment. As one -financial analyst answered when
questioned about the TAKX's guaranteed rate o-f return, "in
leveraged leasing, there is no such thing as a guaranteed
rate o-f return."
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4. Other Tax Considerations
As discussed in Chapter V on -financing private U.S.
-flag vessels, Congress provides certain tax subsidies to the
Maritime industry for ships built or reconstructed in the
United States. All o-f the studies which have examined the
TAKX build and charter program to date have not examined the
possible rami-f icati ons o-f existing -federal maritime
subsidies. Speci -f i cal 1 y , can the owners/lessors increase
their leverage and implicit rates or return through any o-f
the programs presently administered by the Maritime
Admini strati on?
A review o-f the various programs, reveals that the
equity participants may be eligible -for participation in the
Capital Construction Fund (CCF) using a single vessel
agreement. As was pointed out in Chapter V , the single
vessel agreement generally applies to leveraged lease
transactions and permits each equity participant to
establish a CCF. The Maritime Administration must review
the transaction to ensure it meets certain investment
standards and then issue a ruling for each specific single
vessel agreement. Approval of the equity participant's
application should enable it to increase the size of the tax
benefits it presently enjoys under the basic TAKX charter
agreement. The Navy and the equity participants have
recognized the potential impact of CCF participation have
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agreed to negotiate the bene-Fits emi mating -from any such CCF
parti ci pat i on
.
5. F'rice o-f TAKX Ships
One o-f the justi -f i cati ons given -for the TAKX build
and charter program was the positive impact it would have on
the deteriorating U.S. shipbuilding industry. Foreign
competition has si gni -f i cantl y eroded the U.S. shipbuilding
base. In testimony be-fore the House Committee on Ways and
Means in February 1933, Deputy Assistant Secretary o-f the
Navy Everett Pyatt noted that TAKX would alleviate the
potential loss o-f $97 million in existing notes and bonds
guaranteed by the U.S. Maritime Administration under Title
XI o-f the Merchant Marine Act. In addition, TAKX was
estimated to create or preserve over 12,000 jobs in the U.S.
shipbuilding industry, and help avert the closure o-f at
least three shipyards.
Given the depressed state o-f the U.S. shipbuilding
industry, did the Navy get the best available price -for the
TAKX ships? In response to that question, Military Seali-ft
Command o-f-ficials noted that the ships were contracted -for
through the standard competitve bid process prescribed -for
Department of Defense acquisitions. Was that the best
pri ce?
Whether the Navy, through MSC, could have negotiated
a lower price -for the TAKX ships is open to conjecture. Two
points, however, are germane to such conjecture. One, what
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level o-f pro-fit, i -f any, was the Navy willing to provide the
shipbuilders in view of existing market conditions? Two, to
what extent should the Federal government take advantage o-f
depressed industries? Clearly, the answers to both
questions are a matter of national policy, not just Navy
pol icy.
The question o-f whether a private sector shipping
company could have negotiated a lower price is also open to
conjecture. Certainly, the private sector would have had
-far less altruistic concerns over the state of the U.S.
shipbuilding industry. Assuming their primary motive is
pro-fit, the private sector could be expected to take
advantage o-f a "buyer's market" and drive the hardest
bargain possible when negotiating with a depressed industry.
Price, however, is also a -function o-f volume and -financing.
Clearly, no private firm could embark upon the
construction of eighteen ships over a three year period.
First, the ability of the present maritime shipping market
to absorb the increased carrying capacity makes such
expansion doubtful. Second, the cost of financing such a
program is well beyond the means of most all private sector
shipping companies. Even on a per ship basis, the cost
would be higher because private shipping companies cannot
obtain the lower financing rates available to the
government.
13:
For the purposes of pure conjecture, i f a private
company decided to undertake a program similar to TAKX using
a leveraged lease, the costs would have certainly been
higher. As noted in Chapter v" , no private shipping company
enjoys the same credit rating as the Federal government. As
a result, the assignment o-F their charter hire payments as
security -for the non—recourse long—term debt would have
fallen into a higher risk category. That higher risk-
category would have driven interest rates up and the charter
hire would have risen commensuratel y
.
The question o-f ship price, there-fore, is difficult
to assess. Pricing is a function of several considerations,
some on a macro—economi c level and others on a micro-
economic level. To compare the purchase price of the TAKX
ships with what may have been available to a private sector
buyer is essentially impossible due to size considerations
and the differing motivations between the private and public
sectors.
6. Residual Value
As discussed in Chapter Four, the value of the TAKX
ships at the end of the 25—year lease term is a significant
consideration in the 1 ease—versus-buy cost analysis. The
residual value is important for two reasons. First, the
residual value represents a one-time cash inflow at the end
of the lease term. The size of this one-time cash inflow is
part of the formula for determining the amount of the
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periodic lease payments required by the lessor to earn an
acceptable rate o-f return on the investment.
Second, 1 ease—versus—buy cost analysis requires the
user be in the same economic position under either
acquisition alternative at the completion o-f the lease term.
Under the purchase alternative, when the user is -finished
using the asset, theoretically, it can be disposed o-f by the
owner at a pro-fit. That pro-fit, discounted over the period
the asset is used, represents a reduction in the real
purchase price o-f the asset. Under the lease alternative,
the user does not own the asset at the end o-f the lease term
and does not benefit -from any residual value which remains
in the asset. To make the two alternatives similar -for
comparative purposes, the residual value must be deducted
-from the cost o-f the purchase alternative, or be added to
the cost o-f the lease alternative.
Accurate prediction o-f an asset's residual value at
some future date is extremely di-f-ficult. In the interests
o-f conservatism, lessors o-f ten assume a residual value o-f
zero which requires the lessor to recapture the cost o-f the
investment through lease payments and associated tax
benefits. The zero residual value assumption, however, may-
result in overly high, and there-fore uncompetitive, lease
terms. To eliminate the risk associated with incorrectly
estimating the residual value, many lessors have turned to
third parties to guarantee the residual value of the leased
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asset. Such guarantees increase the cost o-f the asset to
the lessor who, presumably, passes it on to the lessee
in the -form o-f higher periodic lease payments. CRef . 123
In the TAKX Requests -for Proposals, the Navy did not
require potential equity participants to make any minimum
residual value assumptions. While IRS regulations require a
20 percent residual value assumption be made -for lease
classification purposes, no such requirement applies to
potential lessors when determining their lease rental terms.
By not stipulating a minimum residual value assumption, the
Navy permitted potential equity participants to avoid any
risk associated with incorrectly estimating the residual
value. As noted above, such risk is an important
consideration in private-sector leasing agreements.
Did the Navy benefit by not requiring a minimum
residual value assumption? On the one hand, the Navy
benefited from the lessor's lower cost of acquisition
resulting from the lessor not having to insure the residual
value of the TAKX ships. On the other hand, the Navy must
pay higher periodic lease payments because of the zero
residual value assumption. In addition, the lessor will
receive the benefits of any residual value which may exist
at the end of the lease term. In effect, the lessor could
realize a higher rate of return on his investment than
explicitly determined by the lease agreement, which
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stipulated a rate o-f return based on a zero residual value
assumpt i on.
The answer to the question of whether the Navy
benefited from not stipulating a minimum residual value
assumption depends, in large part, upon whether a residual
value will exist upon completion of the 25—year TAKX lease
term. The size and likelihood of any residual value is
dependent upon an assessment of the risks involved and is,
therefore, open to conjecture. Should have, and could have
the Navy negotiated additional lease terms which would have
permitted the Navy to benefit from any residual value
remaining in the asset Are the more pertinent questions.
Present leasing laws prevent the lessee from
obtaining the asset -for a bargain purchase price. They do
not, however, prevent a readjustment of lease payments which
would reflect the existance of a residual value as it
becomes more apparent ower time that such a residual value
will exist. Such a provision seems appropriate -for a
transaction like the TAKX leveraged lease where the
government assumes all the risk associated with uncertain
residual values.
C. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
The issues which have arisen from the TAKX transaction
have been analyzed from two different perspectives. First,
the issues o-f 1 ease-versus—buy cost analysis were examined
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and second, a private sector comparison was made with the
TAKX transaction.
The review of Federal government lease showed that prior
to TAKX, no speci-fic guidelines existed -For consistently
assessing the costs o-f a lease and comparing those costs
with a purchase alternative. The O-f-fice o-f Management and
Budget and the Treasury Department have since provided
specific guidelines for assessment o-f -future long—term
leases or charters contemplated by the Department o-f
De-fense. Those guidelines Are very stringent and generally
assign all o-f the indirect costs o-f leasing, as well as the
direct costs, o-f leasing to the Federal agency contemplating
the lease. Whether it is proper to assign the indirect
costs o-f leasing to those agencies, however, is
quest i onabl e.
One o-f the major issues, which has gone largely ignored,
is the government's -failure to provide a mechanism which can
assess the costs and benefits o-f a 1 ease—versus— don ' t buy
decision. Present methodologies s.re structured to only
assess the 1 ease—versus—buy alternatives. Long-term leasing
enjoys some significant advantages awer the purchase
alternative, such as spreading out the cash outlays of a
program over the useful life of the asset. Present methods
of lease analysis ignore some very important considerations
which could cause the decision maker to make incorrect
choices with respect to leasing.
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The TAKX transaction compares -favorably with practices
in the private sector. On the issue o-f overly generous tax
indemnities, we have seen that the Navy con-formed to
generally accepted leasing practice. On the issues or
guaranteed rate o-f return and residual value, however, the
Navy does not appear to have done as well as it might have.
The provision o-f a guaranteed 1 1 . 745X rate o-f return (a BAA
risk assessment) is defensible in view o-f the complexity and
size o-f the TAKX transaction. On the other hand, -firms in
the private sector have issued extremely large debt issues
and achieved terms which were similar to the then existing
Treasury bill rates (or a AAA risk assessment). Once again,
the complexity o-f the TAKX transaction with its numerous
parties and legal complications certainly affected the rate
o-f return which potential investors were willing to accept.
On the issue o-f minimum residual values, the Navy
permitted potential equity participants to make zero
residual value assumptions in their bids. The effect of
permitting a zero residual value assumption, is to increase
the amount of periodic lease payments. Since the terms of
each of the TAKX contract Are proprietary information, it is
impossible to determine the impact of allowing equity
participants to make their proposals assuming zero residual
value. Assuming, however, that the TAKX ships will retain
some value at the end of 25 years, those contracts (if any)
which included a zero value assumption will have cost the
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government more than i f some minimum residual value
assumption had been made mandatory.
The results o-f this analysis have permitted us to look
at many o-f the lessons learned -from the TAKX transaction.
The -final chapter of this study will provide some o-f those
lessons learned, drawn, not -from participation, but -from an
analysis o-f the issues and the documents which have been a
part o-f the TAKX transaction. The direct participants in
TAKX (principally the Military Seal if t Command and the
Navy's TAKX lease advisor, Argent Group, Ltd.) certainly
possess the most knowledge and expertise from which to
formulate a more detailed and comprehensive set of
guidelines for future long-term leases of Defense assets.
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VII. • SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The TAKX transaction -forced the government to come to
grips with two o-f the most important issues which surround
government acquisitions through leases: (1) Selecting the
correct 1 ease-versus-buy cost analysis methodology, and (2)
Setting bounds on the use o-f tax-benefits by government
agencies to partially subsidize the acquisition o-f their
assets.
The TAKX transaction, in particular, has drawn criticism
-from both inside and outside the Federal government. The
primary -focus o-f that criticism has centered on the Navy's
analysis o-f leasing costs and its use o-f tax laws and tax
indemnity guarantees to acquire the TAKX ships. Much o-f
that criticism, however, has -failed to recognize the single
most important constaint faced by the Navy when it acted to
acquire the TAKX ships: the Navy had already been re-fused
the -funds it needed to buy the ships.
The preceding chapters have examined the TAKX
transaction -from two broad perspectives. First, the issues
and elements which determine the government's costs o-f
leasi ng-versus-buying were examined. Second, the TAKX
transaction was compared, in so -far as possible, with
private sector leasing practices. From that analysis, the
relative merits and weaknesses o-f the TAKX transaction were
exposed in an attempt to better understand the nature o-f
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government and Department o-f De-fense leasing. This chapter
will synthesize lessons learned which can serve as
guidelines -for -Future lease transactions.
A. TAKX LESSONS LEARNED
1 . TAKX Transaction Structure
The TAKX transaction was care-fully structured to
take advantage o-f existing tax laws and IRS rulings to
provide potential investors with signi-ficant tax benefits
and, as a result, reduce the Navy's overall cost o-f
acquisition. The TAKX ships were acquired through Time
Charter agreements which contracted speci -f i cal 1 y -for
transportation services, and not the use o-f a ship. Such a
distinction was important because the tax laws speci -f i cal 1 y
denied certain tax benefits i -f the Navy were considered to
have either acquired ownership o-f the TAKX ships, or
acquired use o-f the TAKX ships and not just transportation
servi ces.
The TAKX Time Charter agreements provided -for three
principal parties to ensure the availability o-f the desired
tax benefits. To separate the Navy and the owners/lessors,
a third party, called the contractor, was made a party to
the transaction. The contractor was initially charged with
several responsibilities including:
a. Arranging -for the construction or conversion o-f the
TAKX shi ps
, i ncl udi ng any interim -financing
requi rements;
b. Arranging long—term -financing -for potential equity
parti ci pants;
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c. Finding equity participants to buy the ships and then
bareboat chartering the ships back -from the owners;
and
d, Operating the TAKX ships, including manning,
navigating and maintaining the ships.
While sound in theory, the structure just described
su-f-fered several practical shortcomings. First, the
contractors which the Navy selected were basically ship
operators and were not skilled in the intricacies o-f high
-finance ar contract negotiation. Second, the requirement
for the contractors to arrange both interim and long—term
-financing created an artificial, but no less real,
competition -for -funds. Instead o-f just one entity seeking
construction and long-term debt -funds -for the TAKX ships,
-four companies were competing with each other -for those
funds. And third, the contractor's presence between the
Navy and the owners/lessors required extremely complex and
detailed contracts to provide the legal and monetary
protection both parties needed against possible default by
the contractor.
As the transaction proceeded from its initial
stages, it appears the Navy quickly realized the
contractor's limitations and interceded. The ability of the
contractors to arrange construction financing was hampered
by their generally poor credit ratings, a reluctance on the
part of the financial community to accept the tenet that the
government's full faith and credit stood behind the
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contractor's obligations, and the artificial competition -for
funds just described. According to a Military Seal if t
Command source close to the TAKX transaction, the Navy
quickly recognized these problems and interceded.
Significantly it renegotiated the interim (construction)
financing terms to achieve terms more representative of the
government's superior credit. In some cases, already signed
financing agreements were terminated. The Navy also assumed
final responsibility for selecting equity and debt
participants. While the contractor's financial agents were
left in charge of soliciting participation proposals, the
Navy reserved final determination for itself.
Finally, despite initial assumptions to the
contrary, the use of a Time Charter arrangement through a
contractor has not assured the tax benefits originally
envisioned. While not ruling officially on the availability
of any ITC with respect to the TAKX transaction, the IRS has
let it be known that it considers the Navy to have acquired
use and not just the services of the TAKX ships. As a
result, the equity participants have not claimed the ITC and
the Navy has agreed to indemnify them for the loss of that
tax benefit. Thus, the existance of a contractor in any
future Navy charter is of questionable utility. From a
position of twenty—twenty hindsight, the inclusion of a
contractor only served to make the TAKX transaction much
more complicated and, as a result, probably more expensive
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than it would have been had the contractor not been
included
.
2. Politics o-F Tax-Exempt Leasing
The controversy which surrounds the TAKX transaction
did not originate with the Navy and TAKX. In -fact, the TAKX
leveraged lease transaction was not the -first build and
charter program undertaken by the Navy. As noted in earlier
chapters, the Navy has regularly chartered vessels from the
private sector since World War II. Long-term leasing by
tax—exempt entities, however, gained much greater prominence
when Congress enacted the Economic Recovery Tax Act o-f 1981
(ERTA) . ERTA greatly liberalized the rules surrounding
leasing and the transfer o-f tax benefits between the parties
to a lease. Under the provisions o-f ERTA, several
tax—exempt entities entered into sal e-1 easeback arrangements
with private taxpaying entities to raise cash or finance
acquisition of capital assets. Those transactions were
subsidized, in part, by the tax-exempt parties selling the
tax -benefits they were unable to use to private taxpaying
parties which could use them. Large, taxpaying parties were
able to shelter large amounts of income from taxes through
such tax shelter programs. The net effect of such
arrangements was to reduce the tax revenues collected by the
Federal Treasury.
The Navy TAKX transaction brought Congressional
concerns over these perceived abuses of the Federal tax
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system to a head. The Joint Committee on Taxation's report
on Federal leasing in 19B3 generally voiced Congressional
concern by stating,
"Behind the TAKX arrangement is a set of broader
questions related to leasing by nontaxable entities
such as Federal departments. . . CtheD use o-f
sophisticated, tax-motivated arrangements by tax—exempt
entities creates perceptions that the tax system is
unfair, especially i -f the Federal government itsel-f
engages in the practice." CRef. 25: pp. 2—3D
The TAKX transaction was clearly singled out as an example
of such abuse and came under the Congressional eye. The
terms of the transaction and the cost-analysis methodologies
used in support o-f TAKX were subjected to intense scrutiny.
While no specific guidelines existed concerning
long-term leasing by the Defense Department, the Navy
insured that the cognizant Congressional oversight
committees on defense spending were appraised of the Navy's
charter intentions -from the outset. Unfortunately, approval
by the oversight committees was insufficient to quell the
ensuing controversy which arose o\/er the TAKX transaction as
its details became known to the public and Congress as a
whole. Two elements of the transaction should have
foreshadowed the controversy: one, the monetary size of the
TAKX transaction, and two, the issue of Congressional
control o^/&r Defense Department leasing.
In the first instance, large defense acquisitions
have always stirred intense Congressional debate. The total
size of the TAKX transaction was more than sufficient to
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gain public attention once approved. The use o-f tax-benefit
transfers, at a time when Congress was becoming increasingly
alarmed about their cost to Federal coffers, was also
guaranteed to attract public attention.
In the second instance, the abridgement o-f the
normal Congressional oversight process permitted by the lack
o-F speci-fic leasing guidelines was certain to be noticed by
Congressional De-fense watchdogs. Programs o-F the size o-f
the TAKX transaction a.re just too big to go unnoticed.
With the passage o-F the De-Ficit Reduction Act of
1984 (DRA) , Congress has moved to prohibit government
agencies from using tax-benefit transfers to subsidize their
acquisition of capital assets. DRA generally denies any
investment tax credit or accelerated depreciation deductions
on assets owned by private parties and leased or chartered
to the Federal government under a long—term agreement.
The primary lesson to be learned from the
controversy which enveloped the TAKX transaction is to
maintain a continuing sensitivity to Congressional moods
concerning defense spending and budget deficits. The TAKX
transaction crossed both lines by its sheer size and its use
of Federal tax subsidies. The Navy must take care to
present any similar future transactions in such a way that
clearly shows the Navy's regard for Congressional concerns.
Specifically, if Congressional guidelines do not exist for
oversight procedures or cost-analysis methodologies,
149
specific guidance should be requested be-fore acquisition
decisions are made. As demonstrated by the TAKX
controversy, Congress does not react well to a "-fait
accompl i . "
3. Impact on the Navy Industrial Fund
The impact o-f the TAKX transaction on the Navy
Industrial Fund (NIF) will be significant. Chapter III
noted the large negative unobligated balance the Military
Seal if t Command is forced to carry as a result of its long
term charters. The TAKX transaction will exceed the NIF's
ability to carry such charters and has forced the Navy to
carry part of such obligations against the entire Operation;
and Maintenance appropriation. The net impact on overall
Navy operations is difficult to assess. If the Navy is
permitted to increase its Operations and Maintenance
appropriation, the impact should be nil. If, however,
Congress decides to make the Navy absorb the TAKX
obligation, the Navy would have to absorb a loss of about
one percent of its 0°<M funds to provide for TAKX. CRef. 18:
pp. 6-7 - 6-93
The primary reason for the large negative impact on
the NIF is that no special appropriation or contract
authority exists to cover the advance contract obligations
required by build and charter programs. The TAKX
transaction requires the Navy to enter into 5-year charter
agreements plus, agree to severe agreement termination
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penalties. The Navy uses the unobligated balance of
customer orders provided to the Navy Industrial Fund to
cover its charter obligations. TAKX has forced the Navy to
use the Operations and Maintenance appropriation to cover-
its termination liabilities.
In an effort to limit the negative impact of charter
obligations, the Navy's Comptroller has directed MSC to
attempt to limit its charter periods to one-year periods so
that large sums Are not obligated in any one y&a.r . Future
build and charter programs should be structured to permit
one—year charter periods and thereby reduce the impact they
have on the NIF and the Navy's Operations and Maintenance
appropri at i on
.
4. Lease-Versus-Don ' t Buy
As noted from the outset, all of the major studies,
which examined the TAKX transaction, have conducted their
analyses using some form of a 1 ease—versus-buy cost
comparison methodology. Are the costs of leasing and buying
the only determinants in a lease analysis? Chapter II
pointed out that the decision to lease or buy was a
secondary decision to be made after the acquisition
decision. The importance of this sequence should not be
lost on the Navy. Once the decision has been made to
acquire an asset, the 1 ease-versus-buy analysis is
appropriate only as long as a purchase alternative is
available. If the purchase alternative is not available,
151
then the appropriate analysis to conduct is a 1 ease—versus-
don ' t buy cost comparison.
In the case o-f the TAKX transaction, all o-f the
major studies lost sight o-f the -fact that Congress had
re-fused to appropriate money -for the TAKX ships. When the
Navy decided to pursue the build and charter alternative,
the appropriate cost comparison should have been between the
leveraged lease and the cost of continuing the status quo
for the period o-f the charter. Presumably, at some time in
the -future new ships would have to be built to replace aging
ships or to meet emerging needs. What are the projected
costs o-f not buying now, but at some -future point when the
need became so pervasive as to motivate Congress to
appropriate the needed construction funds? Experience has
shown that those replacement costs will be much higher than
if acquired now.
Other elements of the leasing alternative are also
ignored by the standard 1 ease-versus-buy cost comparison
methodologies. Chapter VI pointed out that lease financing
was comparative to loan financing in only one respect: the
same asset is acquired. The same financing, however, is not
acquired. That basic difference has fundamental
consequences for the Department of Defense. Presently, the
services are required to pay for their assets up front. In
other words, military systems are completely paid for within
the first few years of their useful lives. As a result, the
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initial cash outlays -for those systems are very high and no
cash outlays Ar~ incurred -for their remaining service li-fe.
Leasing, on the other hand, spreads out the cost o-f services
or the asset o\/sr the periods o-f use. Should the costs and
benefits o-f such -financing be ignored when comparing the
lease with a purchase option?
The Navy must understand the basic difference
between the 1 ease-versus-buy or don't buy cost analyses and
proceed accordingly. If the Navy permits lease analysis to
be conducted using the wrong circumstance, i.e. buy instead
of don't buy, it risks reaching the wrong conclusions
concerning the desirablity of an acquisition. Similarly, if
the Navy permits watchdog agencies to use the wrong
circumstance, it risks having its decisions being challenged
on inappropriate comparative data. It is incumbent upon the
Navy to ensure the appropriate circumstances and data a.re
analyzed and compared when considering the lease
al ternati ve.
5. Understanding the Market
In response to its request for equity participation
in the TAKX transaction, the Navy received offers which
totaled about 300 percent of that needed to fund the ships.
Such a response indicates the desirability of TAKX as an
investment. Chapter VI painted out that the guaranteed rate
of return was not considered to be exorbitent, nor were the
other terms of the agreement out of line with what was found
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in the private sector. Why, then, was there such apparent
enthusiasm -for participation in the TAKX transaction?
The major reason probably stems -from the nature o-f
the tax—shelter market in 19S2 and 19S3. During those
years, the IRS was looking increasingly hard at various tax
shelters which had enjoyed popularity during the previous
years. Shelters which had once appeared secure, were
collapsing under changing or tightening IRS regulations.
The appearance o-f the TAKX transaction o-f-fered a tax—shelter
that was not only competitve with available shelters, but
appeared to have the blessing o-f the Federal government.
Given that backdrop, TAKX points out a critical
aspect to be considered in similar transactions in the
-future. The government guarantee is a particularly powerful
tool, especially during periods o-f uncertainty. While the
terms o-f government contracts may appear competitive, the
market is always changing. The TAKX terms can be adequately
de-fended -from a position which points to the size and
complexity o-f the transaction, and the -fact that the rate of
return was competitively bid. But, given the remarkable
response by investors to the TAKX transaction, one must
speculate whether the government achieved the most
advantageous terms.
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B. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE
1. Effect o-f the Deficit Reduction Act o-f 1984
Chapter III noted that the De-Ficit Reduction Act of
19S4 has essentially precluded -future lease transactions
similar to the TAKX leveraged lease. The thrust o-f DRA was
to eliminate perceived abuses o-f the tax laws by tax-exempt
entities, by greatly restricting the availability o-f certain
tax—benefits which form the heart and soul of leveraged
leasing. DRA does not, however, totally preclude the use of
leases or charters to acquire naval assets on a short-term
basis. Property leased for less than the greater of one
year or 30 percent of the Treasury determined asset
depreciation range (ADR) class life (but not longer than
three years) is exempt from the DRA restrictions.
Certain "qualified technological equipment" such as
computers, computer peripherals, hi-tech telephone
equipment, and hi—tech medical equipment are exempt from DRA
cost recovery restrictions if leased for terms of no longer
than five years. Such leases are subject to other
restrictions designed to maintain the integrity of DRA. True
service leases are also exempted from DRA ' s provisions.
CRef. 231
Thus, while leveraged leasing of the TAKX sort has
been effectively prohibited, the opportunity to use
tax-oriented leases in the acquisition of certain assets,
such as computer and communication equipment, remains
-feasible. The lessons which the Navy learned -from the TAKX
transaction are applicable when considering such leases.
2. QMB/Treasury Lease Analysis Guidelines
Chapter IV presented the new CMB/Treasur y lease
analysis guidelines to be used by the Department o-f Defense
when considering long-term leasing or chartering o-f aircraft
or naval vessels. Those guidelines supplant the ambiguity
over the treatment o-f certain elements in 1 ease—versus—buy
cost comparisons which existed prior to TAKX.
As noted in Chapter VI and above, however, the Navy
must understand and make others aware that the results o-f
such analysis may not be applicable to the problem at hand.
That is, the lease—versus-buy cost comparison is applicable
only when buying 1 s an alternative. Under certain
circumstances, like TAKX -for instance, buying is not an
alternative and the problem becomes a 1 ease—versus—don ' t buy
consideration. The Navy must be prepared to make such a
distinction, conduct the appropriate cost comparisons, and
effectively present that analysis to the appropriate
oversight body.
3. Congressional Lease Oversight
Chapter III also reviewed recent defense
authorization initiatives which have established greater
congressional control over the long-term military leasing.
The services are now required to appraise Congress o-f any
intended lease or charter for aircraft or naval vessels
156
which have a term of greater than -five years or more than
one-half the usetul li-fe of the asset. Requests for such
long-term leases will be subjected to the same review
process as requests for purchases of major systems.
As a result, the financing terms of proposed leases
and charters, as well as the asset's performance criteria,
will be subjected to critical review. While proposals for
acquisitions through outright purchase include sophisticated
financial analysis, the scope of that analysis does not
include many of the factors generally present in complex
leasing agreements. To assure even and complete treatment
of the numerous additional factors involved in the lease
transaction, the Navy should develop a model which will
provide oversight bodies with detailed estimates of the
costs of lease financing. Such a model should also provide
a sensitivity analysis of the various financial elements,
such as discount rates, interest rates, and tax-benefit
transfers, which influence the leasing decision.
4. Extent of Government Involvement
One of the primary lessons learned from TAKX was the
need for the government to be integrally involved in all
aspects of a major leveraged lease or charter program. Such
transactions Are complicated by the complex legal
requirements and, the myriad of tax laws and rulings which
surround such leases. TAKX originally envisioned that the
contractors would arrange the entire transaction in
157
accordance with guidelines and parameters- established by the
Navy. Chapter III noted that the ' contractors were generally
expected to arrange -for the -financing and construction of
the TAKX ships, and to find equity and debt participants to
facilitate the charter of those ships to the Navy.
Unfortunately, the contractors selected by the Navy did not
have the requisite knowledge ar expertise to arrange such a
complex transaction.
As Chapter VI noted, the Navy had to intervene to
ensure that the Federal government's superior credit was
fully appreciated by the financial market when setting the
terms o-f the TAKX leveraged lease. In that regard, the TAKX
transaction, as it finally evolved, provides an excellent
blueprint for structuring the terms and agreements of
similar transactions in the future.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. IMPACT OF SHIP CHARTERS AND LONG-TERM LEASES ON NAVY
OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE APPROPRIATIONS
As Chapter III noted, the impact of long-term
obligations resulting from ship chartering agreements poses
a problem for Navy accounting. The Navy pays for the ships
it charters using the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF). NIF is
funded from the Navy's annual Operations and Maintenance
(0?<M) appropriation. Most of the Navy's ship charters,
however, ana multi-year contracts which obligate the Navy
for a series of annual charter payments. In addition,
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termination liabilities like those agreed to in the TAKX
transaction, must be obligated -for. Currently, there is no
outlay authority to cover such -Future year obligations. Q&M
-funds cannot be used since they ^rs appropriated on an
annual basis and cannot be used -for -future year commitments.
The Navy has been -forced to use a technical loophole that
permits the Navy Industrial Fund to use the unobligated
balance o-f receivables to o-f-fset -future obligations
resulting -from multi-year commitments. Currently, no
-funding mechanism exists -for the Navy to account -for -future
obligations which result -from multi-year lease or charter
agreements.
2. Determination o-f an Appropriate Federal
Government Discount Rate
Chapter IV highlighted the problems surrounding the
selection o-f an appropriate discount rate -for Federal
government present value analysis. The Federal government
has directed the Department o-f Defense to use the interest
rate on new Treasury securities whose maturity most closely
corresponds with the term o-f the proposed lease as the its
discount rate. The private sector has been unable to
adequately resolve the debate which surrounds the selection
o-f a proper discount rate. Given the private sector's
inability to come to a consensus o-f opinion about how to
determine the correct discount rate, has the Federal
government made a good decision in stipulating it's discount
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rate? What a.r& the problems associated with such a method
o-f determination?
3. Spreading out the Cost o-f POP Acquisitions
What are the advantages and disadvantages o-f using
acquisition methods such as long—term leasing to spread out
the cost o-f major assets over their economic lives?
Present lease analysis guidance only addresses the costs of
leasing as opposed to buying. What other considerations
should be taken into account when the lease is compared with
a don't buy alternative?
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE OF THE CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION FUND
TAX DEFERRAL MECHANISM
The Capital Construction Fund (CCF) is a tax-deferral
program, not a tax-exemption program, which will ultimately
allow the government to recoup the taxes deterred by a CCF
participant. The -following example is provided to show how
the CCF participant de-fers taxes by making deposits into the
CCF and then withdrawing those -funds to purchase a new ship.
The CCF participant is permitted to make deposits into
one o-f three separate accounts: the capital account, the
capital gain account and the ordinary income account. The
money deposited into these accounts can come -from a number
o-f sources including: (a) taxable income attributable to the
operation o-f CCF agreement vessels, (b) amounts representing
depreciation allowed on agreement vessels, (c) interest or
dividends earned -from investment of amounts held in the
fund, and (d) net proceeds from the disposition of agreement
vessels. The amount and timing of deposits into the CCF and
the subsequent withdrawal of those funds are subject to
various rules stipulated by the Maritime Administration and
the CCF agreement.
When qualified withdrawals are made from the CCF, they
Are first charged against the capital account, next against
the capital gain account, and last against the ordinary
161
income account. These withdrawals reduce the depreciable
basis of the new vessel -for Federal income tax purposes.
A. FINANCIAL DATA
For the purposes o-f this example assume ACME Shipping,
Inc. has entered into a CCF agreement with the intention o-f
purchasing a ship three years later. Subject to that
agreement, ACME has entered three presently operating
vessels as agreement vessels. The -following additional data
is also provided:
1. Net Income . ACME expects to realize the -following
net income -from the agreement vessels, and to deposit these




2. Capital Gain . On 1 January 1931, the agreement
vessel SS Harvard was sold -for $5 million. $3.5 million o-f
that amount represented a return o-f capital and was
deposited into the CCF ' s Capital Account. The remaining
$1.5 million represented a capital gain and was deposited
into the Capital Gain Account o-f the CCF.
3. Depreci at ion . ACME depreciated its two remaining
vessels on a straightline basis, assuming a 20—year 1 i -f e and
no salvage value. Its annual allowable depreciation
deduction totaled $4 million.
1<S2
4. Interest . ACME is able to invest its CCF -funds in
quali-fied securities at an average interest rate o-f eight
percent per year.
5. Tax Year . The calendar year is ACME ' s tax year.
6. New Ship Purchase . On 5 January 1984, ACME acquires
the new ship SS Stan-Ford at a cost o-f $50 million. ACME
withdraws all o-f its -funds -from the CCF to meet part o-f that
purchase price. ACME intends to depreciate the new ship
using straight line depreciation over a 20—year period and
assumes there will be no salvage value.
B. THE CCF ACCOUNT BALANCE
During the course o-f the three years (1981 through
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Total 1982
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1 , 500 , 000
2 , 000 , 000
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2 , 000 000
160.,000
2,500. 000
* 1 8 , 380 000
16:
1985 Ca. Ltal Acct:
Previous Amount *12, 100,000
Interest Earned 963,000







Net Income -for 1983 2 , 500 , 000
Total 1983 $26,350,000
The totals in the three CCF accounts at the end o-f
1983 can be summarized as -follows:
Capital Acct $15,500,000 (Note 1)
Capital Gain Acct 1,749,600
Ordinary Income Acct 9,100,400 (Note 1)
Total $26,350,000
Note 1: The interest earned on the -funds deposited
in the Capital Account a.r& transferred into
the Ordinary Income Account where they also
accumulate interest. The -figures above
reflect those transfers.
C. BENEFITS OF THE CCF
During the years 1981 through 1983, ACME is able to
defer the payment of taxes on the income it realized from
the operation of the agreement ships by placing it into the
CCF. Assuming that ACME is in the 46 percent corporate tax
bracket, it deferred the following amounts: 1981 - $920,000,
1982 - $1,150,000, and 1983 - $1,150,000. In addition, ACME
deferred capital gains taxes on the disposition of one of
the agreement ships. Assuming a capital gains tax of 40
percent, it deferred an additional $600,000,
164
Once again, these amounts represent tax de-ferrais and
not tax exemptions. These amounts are recovered during
later periods by reducing the depreciable basis of the new
ship which is acquired using the CCF -funds.
D. RECOUPING THE TAX DEFERRAL
As noted above, the Capital Construction Fund enables
the participant to de-fer, not escape, its tax liability.
The government recoups the taxes deferred as the result of
deposits into the CCF by reducing the depreciable basis of
the new vessel acquired using CCF funds. The new vessel s
depreciable basis is reduced in the following manner:
1. Withdrawals from the Capital Account do not reduce the
depreciable basis of the vessel since there a.rs no
taxes deferred on deposits credited to this account.
2. Withdrawals from the Capital Gain Account reduce the
depreciable basis of the vessel by five—eighths of the
amount withdrawn from that account if the CCF
participant is a corporation. If the CCF participant
is an individual or a partnership, the reduction is
one—half of the amount withdrawn from the Capital Gain
Account
.
3. Withdrawals from the Ordinary Income Account reduce
the depreciable basis by an amount equal to that
withdrawn from that account. In other words, the
basis is reduced on a dollar for dollar basis.
In our example, the depreciable basis of the new
ship SS Stanford would be determined as follows:
Cost of SS Stanford $50,000,000
Basis Reductions:
Capital Acct -0-
Capital Gain Acct (Note 1)
(5/3 x $1,749,600) ( 1,093,500)
Ordinary Income Acct ( 9, 100,400)
Adjusted Depreciable Basis $39,806,100
16!
Since ACME intends to depreciate its new ships over
twenty years using straight!, ine depreciation and assumes no
salvage value, the annual allowable depreciation is:
$39,806,475 * 20 = * 1,990, 324
The annual depreciation would have been $2,500,000 if ACME
had not used the Capital Construction Fund. As a result,
ACME's taxable income will be $509,676 greater each o-f the
20 years that the new ship is depreciated.
$2,500,000 - $1,990,324 = $509,676
This greater tax liability over the 20—year li-fe o-f the ship
permits the government to recoup the taxes it de-f erred on





The -following computation is provided to give a general
understanding o-f how the single vessel CCF agreement can
bene-fit a ship leveraged lease equity participant.
The si ngl e—vessel agreement permits the equity participant
to establish a CCF using the new ship as both the eligible
vessel (that vessel which generates the money eligible -for
deposit into the CCF) and as the quali-fied vessel (that
vessel -for which the CCF monies &r& used).
Simplifying assumptions have been made, and the reader
is cautioned to remember that each single vessel agreement
is subject to scrutiny by the Maritime Administration to
insure that the intent and integrity o-f the Capital
Construction Fund is maintained.
A. GENERAL AGREEMENT INFORMATION
Assume the -following in-formation pertaining to a single
vessel that qualifies under the single-agreement provisions
o-f the Capital Construction Fund:
1. Vessel Purchase Price: $200 million
2. Equity Part i cpat i on
:
407. or £80 million
3. Debt Participation: 607. or $120 million
4. Interest on Debt: 127. annually
5. Term o-f Debt Instrument: 20 years
6. Interest on CCF Funds: 87.
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B. ANNUAL DEBT PAYMENTS
The equity participant must service his $120 million
debt obligation over a 20 year period while incurring a 12%
interest charge on the outstanding principle. Assume that
debt payments o-f principal and interest Are made at the
beginning o-f each year. The amount o-f each one o-f those 20
annual payments is:
* 120, 000, 000 - 8.36578 = $ 14, 344, 150
Where $ 120, 000, 000 is the amount borrowed by the
equity participant and 8.36578 is the present value
-factor o-f an annuity due o-f $1 -for 20 periods at 127.
annual interest.
C. DEPRECIATION METHODS AVAILABLE
1
.
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) Method
I-f the equity participant is permitted to depreciate
the single-vessel agreement ship using ACRS, the
depreciation schedule -for the $200 million ship would be:






2. Straight-Line Depreciation Method
I-f the equity participant is required to depreciate
the single-vessel agreement ship using a straight-line
depreciation method, the annual depreciation would be:
$200 million t 20 years = $1C million/year
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157. $30 mi 1 on
227. 44 mi 1 1 i on
217. 42 mi 1 1 i on
217. 42 mi 1 1 ion
217. 42 mi 1 1 i on
D. DEPGSITS REQUIRED FOR SINGLE-VESSEL CCF
1 . Accelerated Depreciation Deposits
I-f the single-vessel CCF participant is permitted to
deposit amounts equal to the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (ACRS) depreciation rate into the Capital Account,
then the equity participant would need only -Four years to
establish an account balance su-f-ficient to service the
remaining sixteen annual debt payments. See the
computations below:
a. CCF Account Balance Required to Retire Debt.
The balance required to retire the remaining debt
outstanding, without having to make -further deposits, can be
accumulated in -four years. This assumes deposits Are made
at the end o-f each year, and that those deposits will earn
87. interest annually. The balance required to make 16
payments o-f $14,344,150 beginning at the beginning o-f the
5th year is computed as -follows:
$14,344,150 x 9.55948 = $137,122,615
Where 9.55948 is the present value -factor -for an annuity
due o-f $1 at 87. annual interest -for 16 years.
b. Deposits Needed to Attain Required Balance. The
singl e—vessel agreement CCF participant can deposit any
amount up to the allowed depreciation -for the applicable
year into the CCF account. As shown in (a) above, the
-fundh older needs to build a balance o-f $137,122,615 in -four
years to establish an amount which can then service the
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=mair g sixteen years o-F the debt obligation without
navin :o make any -further deposits. Assuming the equity
participant desires to make the maximum deposit permitted
under the ACRS depreciation method, the -following annual
deposits would be required:
YEAR DEFQ5IT INTEREST














2. Straightline Depreciation Deposits
I-f the single vessel agreement -fundholder is only
allowed to use straightline depreciation to determine the
amounts deposited in the Capital Account, it will take the
equity participant much longer to establish a balance which
can liquidate the remaining debt service payments. Using
straight-line depreciation, it will take the equity
participant nine years to establish an account balance
capable of meeting the remaining annual debt payments. See
below:
a. CCF Account Balance Required to Retire Debt.
The balance required to retire the remaining eleven years of
debt, beginning with payments in the 10th year would be:
$14,344,150 x 7.71008 = $110,595,000
Where 7.71008 is the present value factor for
an anuuity due of $1 at 87. interest -for 11 years.
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b. Deposits Needed to Acquire Reequired Balance.
Assuming the equity participant would make the maximum
deposits permitted under the straight-line depreciation
method, the -following annual deposits would be needed:
1st 8 Years : -JIO million each year which will
accumulate a balance o-f
$10,000, 000 x 10.63663 = 106,366,300
9th Year : A -final deposit o-f $4,228,700
E. CONCLUSION
As shown above, i f the equity participant is permitted
to use the accelerated depreciation method and has the
resources to do so, a sel -f — 1 i qui dati ng balance can be
quickly established to service the outstanding debt incurred
to buy the si ngl e—vessel agreement ship.
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